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COMING UP FOR AIR: THE 
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF USING EMINENT 
DOMAIN TO CONDEMN UNDERWATER 
MORTGAGES 
Abstract: Following the Great Recession, home prices in many areas cap-
sized, leaving many homeowners “underwater.” Today, home prices have 
not yet returned to pre-recession levels, leading many commentators to 
fear that these underwater mortgages will default and bring about a flood 
of new foreclosures. Local governments are now contemplating using the 
power of eminent domain to condemn these mortgages and reduce the 
principal owed. This move would allow homeowners to build equity and, 
in turn, reduce the fear of default and foreclosure. This Note analyzes the 
constitutionality of using eminent domain in this manner and discusses 
whether it would pass constitutional muster under the Fifth Amend-
ment’s Takings Clause. 
Introduction 
 Beginning in late 2007 the U.S. economy faltered, leading to one 
of the worst recessions in the country’s history.1 The turbulence of the 
U.S. economy had been precipitated by problems arising in the mort-
gage and housing markets.2 Though the cause of the current mortgage 
market collapse has been fiercely debated, its negative effect on the 
larger economy is undeniable.3 With the housing market still strug-
gling, the larger economy has been slow to fully recover.4 
                                                                                                                      
 
1 See The Recession and Recovery in Perspective, Fed. Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, http:// 
www.minneapolisfed.org/publications_papers/studies/recession_perspective/index.cfm? (last 
visited Nov. 13, 2013); Weekend Edition Saturday: The Great Recession, Five Years Later, Nat’l 
Pub. Radio (Dec. 8, 2012, 8:00AM), http://www.npr.org/2012/12/08/166784038/the-great- 
recession-five-years-later. 
2 Robert Hardaway, The Great American Housing Bubble: Re-Examining Cause and Effect, 35 
U. Dayton L. Rev. 33, 37 (2009); Christopher L. Peterson, Foreclosure, Subprime Mortgage 
Lending, and the Mortgage Electronic Registration System, 78 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1359, 1359 (2010); 
Aleatra P. Williams, Foreclosing Foreclosure: Escaping the Yawning Abyss of the Deep Mortgage and 
Housing Crisis, 7 Nw. J.L. & Soc. Pol’y 455, 456 (2012). 
3 Williams, supra note 2, at 463; see Adam J. Levitin & Susan M. Wachter, Explaining the 
Housing Bubble, 100 Geo L.J. 1177, 1179–81 (2012). Ben Bernanke, Chairman of the Fed-
eral Reserve, described the relationship between the mortgage markets and the overall 
economy, stating that “[d]eclining home prices, delinquencies and foreclosures, and 
strains in mortgage markets are now symptoms as well as causes of our general financial 
and economic difficulties.” Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Re-
2167 
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 Problems in the housing markets have been largely attributable to 
the dramatic decrease in home values following the financial meltdown 
in 2008.5 For a long time, investing in a home was considered to be a 
safe investment that would yield steady appreciation.6 The recent de-
cline in home values, however, has forced a reevaluation of this assump-
tion.7 Many people purchased homes just before the market crashed, 
taking on monthly payments that accounted for a large percentage of 
their budgets.8 Given the traditional wisdom that homes always appre-
ciate in value, homeowners justified these expensive mortgages as safe 
investments.9 But when home prices dropped precipitously, many 
homeowners were left underwater with negative equity—owing more 
on their mortgage than their home was worth.10 
 Having a large number of underwater homeowners can have nega-
tive effects on a community.11 For example, underwater homes are sig-
nificantly more likely to go through foreclosure.12 Foreclosure, in turn, 
                                                                                                                      
serve Sys., Speech at the Federal Reserve System Conference on Housing and Mortgage 
Markets (Dec. 4, 2008), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/ 
bernanke20081204a.htm. 
4 See Williams, supra note 2, at 463–65; Robert Samuelson, Why Is the U.S. Economy 
Struggling?, Real Clear Politics (Feb. 18, 2013), http://www.realclearpolitics.com/ 
articles/2013/02/18/why_job_creation_is_so_hard_117050.html. 
5 Williams, supra note 2, at 463. Although home prices have since stabilized, there was 
a steady decline in home prices for almost six years, starting in 2007 and ending only re-
cently. Christopher Matthews, Should Eminent Domain Be Used to Save Underwater Homes?, 
Time ( July 12, 2012), http://business.time.com/2012/07/12/should-eminent-domain-be-
used-to-save-underwater-home; Talk of the Nation: The Housing Market: Have We Finally Hit 
Bottom?, Nat’l Pub. Radio (Sept. 10, 2012, 1:00PM), http://www.npr.org/2012/09/10/ 
160886672/the-housing-market-have-we-finally-hit-bottom. 
6 See Creola Johnson, Fight Blight: Cities Sue to Hold Lenders Responsible for the Rise in Fore-
closures and Abandoned Properties, 2008 Utah L. Rev. 1169, 1171; Brent T. White, Underwater 
and Not Walking Away: Shame, Fear, and the Social Management of the Housing Crisis, 45 Wake 
Forest L. Rev. 971, 982 (2010). 
7 Johnson, supra note 6, at 1170; see White, supra note 6, at 982. 
8 See Johnson, supra note 6, at 1170; White, supra note 6, at 981–82. 
9 Johnson, supra note 6, at 1170; see White, supra note 6, at 981–82. 
10 See Johnson, supra note 6, at 1170; White, supra note 6, at 981–83. 
11 See White, supra note 6, at 981–83; Dustin A. Zacks, The Grand Bargain: Pro-Borrower 
Responses to the Housing Crisis and Implications for Future Lending and Homeownership, 57 Loy. 
L. Rev. 541, 545 (2011). 
12 Black’s Law Dictionary 719 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “foreclosure”); Christopher 
Matthews, Why Is Ed DeMarco Blocking a Win-Win Housing Program?, Time (Aug. 1, 2012), http:// 
business.time.com/2012/08/01/why-is-ed-demarco-blocking-a-win-win-housing-program/; 
Charles Hugh Smith, Real Estate: The Worrying Numbers Behind Underwater Homeowners, Daily 
Fin. (Aug. 7, 2010, 6:00 AM), http://www.dailyfinance.com/2010/08/07/real-estate-under 
water-homeowners/. 
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puts a community and homeowners at risk of lower property values, 
increased crime rates, and strained government resources.13 
 Despite the large number of underwater mortgages, there has 
been very little government action to provide relief to these homeown-
ers.14 Consider, for example, principal reduction, which has proven to 
be more effective at preventing default than other modifications.15 
Even with this success, the federal government has done little to en-
courage lenders to lower the principal on underwater mortgages.16 In 
fact, the Federal Housing Finance Agency has even discouraged princi-
pal reduction for underwater mortgages.17 By not taking these proac-
                                                                                                                      
13 White, supra note 6, at 981–83; Zacks, supra note 11, at 543–55.Moreover, foreclo-
sures beget more foreclosures in neighborhoods already experiencing high rates of de-
fault, further exacerbating the negative consequences that foreclosures bring to a com-
munity. Zacks, supra note 11, at 555–57. 
14 Gregory Scott Crespi, The Trillion Dollar Problem of Underwater Homeowners: Avoiding a 
New Surge of Foreclosures by Encouraging Principal-Reducing Loan Modifications, 51 Santa 
Clara L. Rev. 153, 178–88 (2011); Robert Hockett, Paying Paul and Robbing No One: An 
Eminent Domain Solution for Underwater Mortgage Debt That Can Benefit Literally Everyone, Cur-
rent Issues in Econ. & Fin., June 2013, at 1, 4. 
15 Laurie S. Goodman et al., The Case for Principal Reductions, J. Structured Fin., Fall 
2011, at 29, 32 (relying on data from 2008 to 2010 to find that principal reductions were 
more effective than other types of loan modifications to alleviate homeowners with nega-
tive equity); see also Memorandum from Michael Stegman, Counselor, Hous. Fin. Policy, to 
Ed Demarco, Acting Dir., Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency 1 ( July 31, 2012), available at http:// 
www.treasury.gov/connect/blog/Documents/letter.to.demarco.pdf (stating that “[p]rincipal 
reduction benefits individual homeowners and the housing market as a whole”). 
16 Hockett, supra note 14, at 4; see Crespi, supra note 14, at 159 (discussing how the 
current federal programs do not seek to prevent strategic default by borrowers who are 
able to make their payments). The federal government instituted the Home Affordable 
Modification Program (“HAMP”) to help eligible homeowners modify their home mort-
gages. See Home Affordable Modification Program, Making Home Affordable, http://www. 
makinghomeaffordable.gov/programs/lower-payments/Pages/hamp.aspx?gclid=CMbbi5u 
A57oCFSbNOgodhF0Arw (last visited Nov. 15, 2013). HAMP imposes significant restric-
tions on which underwater homeowners can be eligible for the program, but HAMP does 
not prioritize principal write-downs, or provide ways to avoid certain restrictions on ser-
vicer actions. See Crespi, supra note 14, at 159; Robert Hockett, It Takes a Village: Municipal 
Condemnation Proceedings and Public/Private Partnerships for Mortgage Loan Modification, Value 
Preservation, and Local Economic Recovery, 18 Stan. J.L. Bus. & Fin. 121, 146–47 (2012). 
These shortcomings have led some to criticize HAMP as being ineffective and a waste of 
taxpayer money. See Hockett, supra, at 146–47; NTU Vote Alert: Vote YES on H.R. 839, the 
HAMP Termination Act of 2011, Nat’l Taxpayers Union (Mar. 29, 2011), http://www.ntu. 
org/news-and-issues/government-reform/hamp-terminate.html. But see U.S. Gov’t Ac-
countability Office, GAO-11-433, Report to Congressional Requesters: Mortgage 
Foreclosures, Documentation Problems Reveal Need for Ongoing Regulatory 
Oversight 26–27 (2011) (proposing that the deficiencies in mortgage loan servicer re-
sponsibilities may be a possible explanation for HAMP’s ineffectiveness). 
17 Statement by Edward J. Demarco, Acting Dir., Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, On the Use of 
Principal Forgiveness by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac ( July 31, 2012), available at http:// 
www.fhfa.gov/webfiles/24113/PFStatement73112.pdf (discussing how HAMP did not im-
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tive steps and discouraging others from doing so, the federal govern-
ment has not adequately addressed the underwater mortgage crisis.18 
Given the lack of action at the federal level, many reformers have called 
for a more localized solution to address the problem of negative eq-
uity.19 
 Local governments and scholars are all currently exploring a plan 
(“the Plan”) that would have municipalities use the power of eminent 
domain to condemn underwater mortgages.20 Under the Plan, the 
municipality would acquire the mortgage by paying the lender 20–25% 
below the fair market value of the home.21 Owning the mortgage would 
                                                                                                                      
 
prove foreclosure avoidance); see Jon Prior, FHFA Refuses Principal Reduction for Fannie, Fred-
die, Hous. Wire ( July 31, 2012, 1:54 PM), http://www.housingwire.com/news/2012/ 
07/31/fhfa-refuses-principal-reduction-fannie-freddie. The FHFA’s decision not to pursue 
principal reduction was largely based on the ineffectiveness of HAMP. Demarco, supra. 
The FHFA has objected to principal reduction despite insistence from the former Secre-
tary of the Treasury, Timothy Geithner, that principal reduction could be an effective 
method of addressing the problems in the mortgage markets. Letter from Timothy F. 
Geithner, Sec’y of the Treasury, to Edward J. Demarco, Acting Dir., Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency 
( July 31, 2012), available at http://www.housingwire.com/sites/default/files/editorial/Sec 
%20Geithner%20Letter%20to%20FHFA%20on%20Principal%20Reduction.PDF. Others 
have criticized the FHFA’s position on principal reduction as well. See, e.g., Matthews, supra 
note 12; George Zornick, Will Mel Watt Back Principal Reduction?, Nation ( June 27, 2013, 1:36 
PM), http://www.thenation.com/blog/175016/will-mel-watt-back-principal-reduction#. Pres-
ident Obama’s appointment of Mel Watt to head the FHFA could change the FHFA’s stance 
against principal reduction, but no action has yet to be taken. Zornick, supra. 
18 See Hockett, supra note 14, at 4. 
19 Hockett, supra note 16, at 150; Joe Nocera, Op-Ed., Housing’s Last Chance?, N.Y. 
Times, July 10, 2012, at A21; David J. Reiss, Comment on the Use of Eminent Domain to Restruc-
ture Performing Loans 5 (Brooklyn Law Sch. Legal Studies Research Paper, Working Paper 
No. 292, 2012); Brad Miller, No Wonder Eminent Domain Mortgage Seizures Scare Wall Street, 
Am. Banker ( July 11, 2012, 7:00 AM), http://www.americanbanker.com/bankthink/emi 
nent-domain-mortgage-seizures-terrify-wall-street-1050811-1.html. 
20 Richard E. Gottlieb & Vivian I. Kim, Eminent Domain: Will Local Governments Attempt to 
Use This Extraordinary Power to Purchase Troubled Residential Mortgages?, Banking & Fin. 
Servs. Pol’y Rep., Nov. 2012, at 1, 1; David Reiss, Opinion, Eminently Reasonable, Nat’l 
Law J., Sept. 24, 2012, at 35, 35; Terry Sheridan, Eminently Controversial, Mortgage Bank-
ing, Oct. 1, 2012, at 112, 113; FAQs, Mortgage Resol. Partners, http://mortgagereso 
lutionpartners.com/faqs (last visited Nov. 14, 2013) [hereinafter MRP FAQs]; infra notes 
101–119 and accompanying text (describing the doctrine of eminent domain). This Note 
refers to the plan devised by Professor Robert Hockett as “the Plan” and will use this schol-
ar’s proposal as the basis for this Note’s evaluation, critique, and suggestions. See Hockett, 
supra note 16, at 150–155. 
21 Gottlieb & Kim, supra note 20, at 4; Memorandum from Walter Dellinger, Jonathon 
Hacker, and Matthew Close to Secs. Indus. and Fin. Mkt. Ass’n 2 ( July 16, 2012) [hereinafter 
“Memorandum from Dellinger et al. to SIFMA”], available at http://www.sifma.org/uploaded 
files/issues/capital_markets/securitization/eminent_domain/memorandumfromo’mel- 
venymyerstosifmaresanbernardinoeminentdomainproposal071612.pdf; Kate Berry, California 
Laws Could Make Eminent Domain ‘DOA,’ Nat’l Mortgage News (Aug. 27, 2012, 9:36AM), 
2013] Condeming Underwater Mortgages Under the Takings Clause 2171 
then allow the municipality to write down the principal owed by the 
homeowner to below the home’s current worth.22 The homeowner, no 
longer underwater, could then refinance to receive lower interest rates 
and start to build equity in the home immediately.23 
 Although the Plan faces many practical hurdles, including getting 
sufficient political support, the Plan also raises a number of legal con-
cerns.24 One such concern is whether the Plan satisfies the Fifth 
Amendment’s Takings Clause.25 The Takings Clause states that the gov-
ernment may only take property when the property is taken for a pub-
lic purpose and when the owner is provided just compensation.26 
 This Note argues that although this plan’s proposal to condemn 
underwater mortgages easily satisfies the public purpose prong of the 
Takings Clause, it likely fails the just compensation prong.27 For the 
Plan to pass constitutional muster, municipalities would have to provide 
additional compensation to lenders to condemn these underwater 
mortgages.28 Consequently, the increased costs associated with provid-
                                                                                                                      
28 See infra notes 284–307 and accompanying text. 
http://www.nationalmortgagenews.com/dailybriefing/Eminent-domian-mortgage-seizure-
strat egy-1031960-1.html. 
22 Gottlieb & Kim, supra note 20, at 4; Reiss, supra note 20, at 35. 
23 Gottlieb & Kim, supra note 20, at 4; Reiss, supra note 20, at 35. 
24 Memorandum from Dellinger et al. to SIFMA, supra note 21, at 1; Jayant W. Tambe 
et al., They Can’t Do That, Can They? Constitutional Limitations on the Seizure of Underwater 
Mortgages, Jones Day 4 ( June 2012), http://www.jonesday.com/files/Publication/f7c9569 
5-ebfe-4a7f-b16a-6fe451e922e6/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/77af6361-ec8a-4a7a-a 
1bf-702398a462a9/They%20Can’t%20Do%20That.pdf; see Editorial, This Dog Won’t Hunt, 
Mortgage Servicing News, Nov. 2012, at 2, 2. Critics have, for example, claimed that the 
Plan violates the Contract Clause of the Constitution. Memorandum from Dellinger et al. 
to SIFMA, supra note 21, at 8; Tambe et al., supra, at 3–4; see U.S. Const. art. 1, § 10, cl. 1; 
Gottlieb & Kim, supra note 20, at 8. Further, opponents have argued that the use of emi-
nent domain to condemn mortgages would violate the Dormant Commerce Clause of the 
Constitution. Memorandum from Dellinger et al. to SIFMA, supra note 21, at 9; see U.S. 
Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3; Gottlieb & Kim, supra note 20, at 8. And given the states’ ability to 
protect constitutional rights beyond what protections are given by the Constitution, oppo-
nents assert that state law could prevent execution of the Plan even if it passes constitu-
tional muster. See Memorandum from Dellinger et al. to SIFMA, supra note 21, at 10–12. 
25 See U.S. Const. amend. V; Sheridan, supra note 20, at 114. 
26 See U.S. Const. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, 
without just compensation.”). Although the Takings Clause has the language “public use,” 
the text has been interpreted to mean public purpose. See U.S. Const. amend. V; Kelo v. 
City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 479–80 (2005) (“Accordingly, when this Court began 
applying the Fifth Amendment to the States at the close of the 19th century, it embraced 
the broader and more natural interpretation of public use as ‘public purpose.’”); Lucas J. 
Asper, Note, The Fair Market Value Method of Property Valuation in Eminent Domain: “Just Com-
pensation” or Just Barely Compensating?, 58 S.C. L. Rev. 489, 492 (2007). 
27 See infra notes 224–283 and accompanying text. 
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ing just compensation would no longer make the Plan politically feasi-
ble.29 
 Part I of this Note explores why so many underwater mortgages go 
through foreclosure, the negative impact that foreclosure has on the 
surrounding community, and why lenders are not independently ad-
dressing this problem.30 Part I goes on to explain the law of eminent 
domain and how it could potentially be used to address the problems 
of underwater mortgages.31 Part II analyzes the constitutional require-
ments of public use and just compensation and how these require-
ments affect the Plan.32 Finally, Part III argues that although the Plan 
satisfies the public use requirement of the Fifth Amendment’s Takings 
Clause, the calculation of just compensation is going to determine the 
Plan’s feasibility.33 
I. The Problem of Underwater Mortgages and a  
Potential Solution 
A. The Foreclosure Crisis 
 Following the housing bubble, the precipitous dropping of home 
prices has left many homeowners underwater.34 With homeowners ow-
ing more on their mortgages than the value of the home, many families 
have stopped viewing their home as an investment and instead view it as 
a liability.35 For some families, the principal owed on the mortgage is 
more than twice the actual fair market value of the home.36 Given this 
large discrepancy, some homeowners have had to reevaluate the value 
of homeownership.37 
 Subsection 1 of this Section examines the recent phenomena of 
underwater mortgages and discusses the problems associated with 
                                                                                                                      
29 See infra notes 284–307 and accompanying text. 
30 See infra notes 34–100 and accompanying text. 
31 See infra notes 101–160 and accompanying text. 
32 See infra notes 161–218 and accompanying text. 
33 See infra notes 219–307 and accompanying text. 
34 See White, supra note 6, at 981–83. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. Hypotheticals of home prices before and after the collapse can be illustrative. See 
id. For example, a couple buying a home in Salinas, California before the collapse could 
expect to pay around $609,000. Id. That same home today, however, would be worth only 
$236,000. Id. 
37 Id. The sample couple in Salinas, California would be able to rent an equivalent 
home for around $1800 per month, compared to their current mortgage payments of 
$4450 per month. Id. 
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them.38 Then, Subsection 2 explains why lenders and loan servicers are 
not independently decreasing principal on underwater mortgages, de-
spite incentives to do so.39 
1. Negative Equity and Its Related Problems 
 Homes with underwater mortgages—those with negative equity— 
are significantly more likely to enter foreclosure than homes with eq-
uity.40 In fact, equity is the single most important predictor of default 
behavior.41 Underwater homeowners often stretch their budgets to pay 
their bills, including mortgage payments, leaving them with little mar-
gin for error in their efforts to keep up with these payments.42 In con-
trast, homeowners with equity built in their homes can access that 
money through refinancing for emergencies.43 With no similar re-
course for underwater homeowners, foreclosure becomes a financial 
necessity.44 
 Normally, properties are foreclosed because the owners are unable 
to make payments, but financially stable underwater homeowners are 
now considering strategically defaulting on their loans.45 In a strategic 
default, a homeowner chooses to stop payments on an underwater 
mortgage despite the ability to pay.46 Many underwater homeowners 
stand to benefit greatly from default.47 These homeowners would be 
better off by defaulting because renting a home of equal size and worth 
would cost far less than their monthly mortgage payments on their un-
                                                                                                                      
38 See infra notes 40–78 and accompanying text. 
39 See infra notes79–100 and accompanying text. 
40 Matthews, supra note 12; see also Smith, supra note 12 (noting that “[t]here’s a direct 
correlation between negative equity and foreclosures”). 
41 Goodman et al., supra note 15, at 29; see Smith, supra note 12. 
42 See Smith, supra note 12. 
43 Why Foreclosure Happens, Prop. Radar, http://www.propertyradar.com/foreclosure-
guides/foreclosure-101/why-foreclosure-happens/ (last visited Oct. 23, 2013). 
44 See id. 
45 Brent T. White, The Morality of Strategic Default, 58 UCLA L. Rev. Discourse 155, 156 
(2010); Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Breaching the Mortgage Contract: The Behavioral Economics of 
Strategic Default, 64 Vand. L. Rev. 1545, 1549 (2011). 
46 White, supra note 6, at 983; Wilkinson-Ryan, supra note 45, at 1548; Zacks, supra note 
11, at 555. 
47 See Johnson, supra note 6, at 1170; White, supra note 6, at 981–83. Recently, there has 
been an increase in information available to these homeowners regarding the financial 
advantages of going through foreclosure. See, e.g., You Walk Away, http://www.youwalk 
away.com/ (last visited Nov. 15, 2013) (providing homeowners with information regarding 
the benefits of strategic defaults). 
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derwater residence.48 Additionally, the cost of foreclosure for many 
homeowners—including moving costs and the negative impact of their 
credit histories—pales in comparison to its benefits.49 Although most 
underwater homeowners have not yet strategically defaulted on their 
loans, commenters have posited that the number of strategic defaults 
could rise sharply if the number of foreclosures reaches a tipping 
point.50 
 Foreclosures have many associated costs to both homeowners and 
lenders.51 For homeowners, beyond having to leave their home—which, 
no doubt, can carry significant sentimental value—there is also a sense 
of shame associated with going through foreclosure.52 Further, the ad-
verse effect on one’s credit history can impact future job prospects and, 
in some circumstances, even result in job loss.53 For lenders, there are 
many transaction costs associated with foreclosure which add to the 
                                                                                                                      
48 See White, supra note 6, at 983; supra notes 36–37. For example, a family purchasing 
a home in Miami at the peak of the housing bubble might have paid around $360,000, 
with monthly mortgage payments totaling almost $2400. White, supra note 6, at 983 & 
n.46. Today, that home would be worth only about $159,000, and renting an equivalent 
home would cost around $1000 per month. Id. If the family continues to pay the original 
mortgage, it could take up to twenty-five years to recover the lost equity. Id. 
49 See id. (noting the benefits of foreclosures, but conceding that “[t]o be sure, foreclo-
sure comes with costs, including a significant negative impact on one’s credit rating”). 
Some states, such as California, even protect homeowners through non-recourse statutes 
which insulate homeowners from liability for any remaining money owed on mortgages 
after the property goes through foreclosure. Wilkison-Ryan, supra note 45, at 1556–57. 
Accordingly, such statutes provide an even greater incentive to underwater homeowners in 
these states to default. Id. at 1556. Even in states without non-recourse statutes, banks often 
lack the resources to pursue defaulting homeowners, allowing homeowners to escape default 
without the bank pursuing the homeowner for the full amount still owed on the loan. Id. 
50 Crespi, supra note 14, at 179; White, supra note 6, at 971–72, 977; Wilkinson-Ryan, 
supra note 45, at 1575; Memorandum from Dellinger et al. to SIFMA, supra note 21, at 2; 
see also Martha C. White, Is the Stigma of Ditching Your Underwater Mortgage Fading?, Time 
(Oct. 15, 2012), http://business.time.com/2012/10/15/is-the-stigma-of-ditching-your-
underwater-mortgage-fading/ (discussing the decreasing stigma attached to strategic de-
fault). 
51 Adam J. Levitin, Resolving the Foreclosure Crisis: Modifications of Mortgages in Bankruptcy, 
2009 Wis. L. Rev. 565, 568–69; see Glenn Setzer, Foreclosures Cost Lenders, Homeowners, the Com-
munity Big Bucks, Mortgage News Daily ( June 2, 2008, 7:00 AM), http://www.mortgage 
newsdaily.com/622008_Foreclosure_Costs.asp. 
52 White, supra note 6, at 993; Zacks, supra note 11, at 543. Even in private decision 
making, such as whether foreclosure is in the family’s best financial interest, societal norms 
often influence the final decision. Wilkinson-Ryan, supra note 45, at 1575. 
53 Zacks, supra note 11, at 544. In the finance industry and in jobs requiring security 
clearance, foreclosure can mean immediate job loss. Id. 
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losses already suffered.54 Lenders traditionally lose a significant per-
centage of their investment in a foreclosure situation, but even greater 
losses are expected in the current market.55 
                                                                                                                     
 In addition to negatively impacting homeowners and lenders, 
foreclosures have negative effects on the community as well.56 One 
negative effect often linked to foreclosures is an increase in crime.57 
Vacant homes serve as a “broken window,” signaling to vandals and 
criminals that a level of disorder and apathy exists in the home, which 
further invites crime.58 Moreover, the decrease in homeownership 
causes a breakdown both in anti-crime surveillance and investment, 
thereby compromising the safety and stability of the neighborhood.59 
Scholars have confirmed the link between foreclosures and crime, not-
ing a rise in both burglary and violent crimes in communities with in-
creased foreclosure rates.60 
 Furthermore, vacant homes often decline from an overall lack of 
maintenance.61 Lenders—who own the property following foreclo-
sure—often do not uphold their responsibility to ensure the property’s 
 
54 Levitin, supra note 51, at 568–69; see Setzer, supra note 51. In 2008, the Joint Eco-
nomic Committee of Congress concluded that the average foreclosure costs a homeowner 
$77,935, while preventing a foreclosure costs $3300. Setzer, supra note 51. 
55 Levitin, supra note 51, at 568–69. One estimate had lenders historically losing 40–
50% in foreclosure, but this loss percentage is expected to grow in the current environ-
ment. Id. 
56 Zacks, supra note 11, at 545. 
57 Id. at 546–49. 
58 Id. at 546. The “broken window theory” posits that if one window in a building is bro-
ken and is left unrepaired, all of the remaining windows in the building will soon be broken. 
See generally George L. Kelling & James Q. Wilson, Broken Windows, Atlantic Monthly, Mar. 
1982, at 29, available at http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1982/03/broken- 
windows/304465/2/. The theory is based on the assumption that broken windows signal to 
outsiders that the inhabitants are apathetic as to whether windows are broken or not, so 
breaking more will cost nothing. Id. With foreclosures, uninhabited homes often signal the 
same level of indifference that broken windows signal. See id. 
59 Zacks, supra note 11, at 546. This phenomenon is, in large part, a result of there be-
ing fewer community members to contact authorities and less money earned through 
property taxes to fund police efforts. See id; Ryan M. Goodstein & Yan Y. Lee, Do Foreclosures 
Increase Crime? 2 (Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. Ctr. for Fin. Research, Working Paper No. 2010-
05, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1670842. 
60 Zacks, supra note 11, at 546–49; see Goodstein & Lee, supra note 59, at 3; Lin Cui, 
Foreclosure, Vacancy & Crime 3 (Nov. 1, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1773706. One study found that a 
1% increase in foreclosure rates correlated with a 10% increase in burglary rates. Good-
stein & Lee, supra note 59, at 4–5. While other studies show that foreclosure alone does not 
increase crime, vacancy of homes—often the product of foreclosure—does. Cui, supra. In 
fact, violent crime increases by more than 15% in the areas that surround vacant fore-
closed homes. Id. 
61 Johnson, supra note 6, at 1171. 
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maintenance and upkeep.62 Due to the complexity of the secondary 
mortgage markets, city officials oftentimes have difficulty discerning 
the legal owner of both the home and the loan.63 Though the deed 
may list the original lender’s name, loans are often securitized and sold 
in the secondary mortgage market with a private registry system han-
dling the mortgage assignments.64 As a result, it can be very difficult for 
city officials to discern the legal owner of a property in order to hold 
the owner accountable for blight.65 
 In addition to increasing crime and blight, vacant homes also lower 
surrounding property values.66 Foreclosures decrease property values by 
simultaneously creating both an increase in supply and a decrease in 
demand for homes in a particular area.67 Furthermore, foreclosed 
homes are sold at auctions where banks will accept less than an opti-
mum price, which is often below fair market value.68 Given that real es-
tate appraisals are influenced by the prices of neighboring homes, the 
vacant homes drive down property values for the entire community.69 
                                                                                                                      
 
62 See id. 
63 Id.; see Christopher Cifrino, Comment, Now UCC Me, Now You Don’t: The Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court Ignores the UCC in Requiring Unity of Note and Mortgage for Foreclosure in 
Eaton v. Fannie Mae, 54 B.C. L. Rev. E. Supp. 99, 104 (2013), http://lawdigitalcommons. 
bc.edu/bclr/vol54/iss6/9. 
64 Johnson, supra note 6, at 1171. Securitization is the process through which an issuer 
creates a financial instrument by combining financial assets and then markets different tiers 
of the financial instrument to investors. Securitization, Investopedia, http://www.investope 
dia.com/terms/s/securitization.asp (last visited Nov. 15, 2013). Mortgage backed securities 
(“MBS”) combine mortgages into a large pool and then divides the pool into smaller pieces 
for issuers to sell to investors. Id. Today, most mortgages are financed through securitization. 
Levitin & Wachter, supra note 3, at 1187. Despite their popularity, MBS received blame as 
being a major cause of the financial meltdown. See Alan Feuer, Poof! How Home Loans Trans-
form, N.Y. Times, Sept. 20, 2009, at MB9. 
65 Johnson, supra note 6, at 1171; see supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
66 Johnson, supra note 6, at 1181; Zacks, supra note 11, at 550–54. 
67 Zacks, supra note 11, at 550. 
68 Id. There is a perception that homes sold at auction are substandard or problematic. 
Grant S. Nelson & Dale A. Whitman, Reforming Foreclosure: The Uniform Nonjudicial Foreclo-
sure Act, 53 Duke L.J. 1399, 1419 (2004). It is generally well-recognized that foreclosed 
properties may have been poorly maintained, vandalized, or gutted. Id. This reputation 
discourages many prospective buyers and subsequently drives down the price that these 
homes are sold for at auction. Id. 
69 Zacks, supra note 11, at 550. This difficulty in appraising homes in a foreclosure-
burdened neighborhood is further compounded by the overall difficulties in appraising 
homes in the current economy. Thomas A. Jaconetty, Real Property Valuation in the Face of the 
National Foreclosure Crisis, Tax Analyst: Special Report, Jan. 28, 2013, at 235, 235. Tur-
moil in the real estate market, with decreased property values stemming from foreclosures 
and short sales, has led some experts to question the accuracy of the real property valua-
tion in this economy. See id. Appraisals for property taxes have proven difficult, given the 
economic stresses and challenges that the current market has caused. Id. As a result, dif-
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 The decreased property values cause problems for the community 
as a whole.70 For example, decreased property values lower the tax rev-
enue cities can collect.71 As a result, the municipality will have fewer 
resources to fight crime, alleviate blight, or combat public nuisances 
such as fire hazards.72 
 The increasing rate of foreclosures also increases the likelihood 
that other homeowners will default on their mortgages.73 This phe-
nomenon can be explained both by the continued depreciation of 
their home as well as by changes in societal norms.74 Although borrow-
ers feel a moral obligation to pay their loan even if it is not financially 
prudent to do so, seeing friends and neighbors go through the process 
can help to alleviate the stigma.75 This explains why in areas that have a 
greater number of foreclosures, the homeowners located therein are 
more likely to strategically default on their loans, even despite their 
ability to continue making payments.76 Although there are many per-
sonal negative effects of foreclosure, the personal gains to some un-
derwater homeowners are so great that very little aside from stigma is 
preventing strategic default.77 This vicious cycle has led some to charac-
terize foreclosures as a “contagion” that spreads throughout areas.78 
2. Why Lenders and Servicers Are Not Addressing Negative Equity 
Themselves 
 For lenders, foreclosure is an undesirable outcome due to the 
transaction costs associated with foreclosure as well as the large losses 
they suffer on their initial investment.79 Given the increased risk of 
                                                                                                                      
ferent jurisdictions have had to rely on different valuation methods to adequately measure 
property values for taxes. See id. at 242–45. 
70 Johnson, supra note 6, at 1181; Zacks, supra note 11, at 550–54. 
71 Johnson, supra note 6, at 1181; Zacks, supra note 11, at 550–54. 
72 Johnson, supra note 6, at 1181; Zacks, supra note 11, at 550–54. This issue is exacer-
bated by the fact that abandoned properties are often significant fire hazards. See Johnson, 
supra note 6, at 1181; Zacks, supra note 11, at 550–54. 
73 White, supra note 6, at 996; Zacks, supra note 11, at 555–57. 
74 See Zacks, supra note 11, at 555–57 (providing statistics from a study that found that the 
“increase in [surrounding] foreclosure rates . . . significantly increases the probability of de-
fault”); see also John P. Harding et al., The Contagion Effect of Foreclosed Properties 27 ( July 
13, 2009) (unpublished manuscript) (confirming that foreclosures lower the property values 
of surrounding homes), available at http://www.business.uconn.edu/Realestate/publications/ 
pdf%20documents/406%20contagion_080715.pdf. 
75 White, supra note 6, at 996; Zacks, supra note 11, at 555–57. 
76 White, supra note 6, at 996; Zacks, supra note 11, at 555–57. 
77 See White, supra note 6, at 979–86; Wilkinson-Ryan, supra note 45, at 1554. 
78 White, supra note 6, at 996; Zacks, supra note 11, at 555–57. 
79 Levitin, supra note 51, at 568–69; see Setzer, supra note 51. 
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foreclosure for underwater mortgages, and the potential that many 
more homeowners may strategically default despite their ability to pay, 
banks have an incentive to reduce homeowners’ principal to ensure 
continued timely mortgage payments.80 In a perfectly functioning mar-
ket without agency or transaction costs, lenders would prefer to incur 
smaller losses from loan modifications rather than larger losses from 
foreclosures.81 
 Despite the benefits of loan modifications, mortgage loan servicers 
have been reluctant to engage in such practices.82 This reluctance to 
modify, in large part, results from the securitization of many mortgage 
loans, through which mortgages are pooled together, packaged, and 
sold to numerous parties.83 As a result of this securitization, many par-
ties, beyond the original lender, would need to be involved in the nego-
tiation process, thereby making it difficult to find consensus among all 
parties involved.84 Given this difficulty, loan servicers often leave the 
mortgage with its original terms, but they remain fearful that future 
litigation may arise that will call into the question the prudence of a 
modification.85 
 Another explanation for low renegotiation rates is that servicers 
often have the perverse financial incentive to foreclose, rather than 
modify a loan.86 Loan servicers often hold no ownership interest in the 
                                                                                                                      
80 See Levitin, supra note 51, at 576; see Crespi, supra note 14, at 169; Goodman et al., 
supra note 15, at 32. 
81 Levitin, supra note 51, at 576 (“In a perfectly functioning market without agency and 
transaction costs, lenders would be engaged in large-scale modification of defaulted or 
distressed mortgage loans, as the lenders would prefer a smaller loss from modification 
than a larger loss from foreclosure.”); see Crespi, supra note 14, at 169; Goodman et al., 
supra note 15, at 32. 
82 Crespi, supra note 14, at 168–69; Levitin, supra note 51, at 624. Loan servicers are 
the entities that collect payments for mortgages, provide billing and tax payments to the 
homeowners, and have sole control over the modification of a loan. Diane E. Thompson, 
Foreclosing Modifications: How Servicer Incentives Discourage Loan Modifications, 86 Wash. L. 
Rev. 755, 776 (2011). Although some servicers are affiliated with the original lender, many 
are not. Id. In fact, most loan servicers have no ownership interest in the loans they ser-
vice. Id. at 767. 
83 Crespi, supra note 14, at 169–70; Hockett, supra note 16, at 139; see Levitin, supra 
note 51, at 647. 
84 Crespi, supra note 14, at 169–70. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. at 172–73; Hockett, supra note 16, at 139–40; Thompson, supra note 82, at 770. 
Although some servicers are affiliated with the original lender, many are not. Thompson, 
supra note 82, at 767. In fact, most loan servicers have no ownership interest in the loans 
they service. Id. Despite this, loan servicers are the only entity with the power to modify 
loans. Id. at 764. As a result, investors—who bear all of the risk of loss from foreclosure—
rarely have a say in whether to modify loans to prevent foreclosure. Id. 
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loan, so even though foreclosure often results in a loss of value for both 
the direct and indirect holders of the mortgage, the loan servicer itself 
has little incentive to foreclose.87 Instead, where the loan servicer is of-
ten compensated on a fixed price basis for performing loans, which will 
be reduced if a loan’s principal or interest rate is modified downward, 
the servicer is incentivized to keep mortgage payments high.88 More-
over, loan servicers are often paid extra for their work during foreclo-
sures.89 Accordingly, the structure of servicer fee arrangements provide 
little incentive for the loan servicers to modify existing loans, despite 
the fact that this often leaves both the lenders and borrowers in a worse 
position.90 
 Moreover, lenders are further reluctant to modify loans as they 
fear that modifying loans will result in overall lost profits.91 Lenders 
believe that homeowners will continue to make payments, even on un-
derwater mortgages accruing negative equity, and therefore view any 
modification to the loan as money wasted.92 They are also aware that 
many borrowers who receive loan modifications quickly re-default, so 
the time lost by postponing default represents lost money to the lend-
er.93 Additionally, lenders worry that showing their willingness to rene-
                                                                                                                      
87 See Thompson, supra note 82, at 767. In fact, the investors with ownership interest in 
the loan can seldom influence the servicer’s actions on loan modifications. Id. at 768. To 
take action against a servicer, a majority of investors must agree, which is often impractical, 
if not impossible, given the large number of potential investors in each security. Id. Even 
when modification is in the best interest of the investors, servicers often choose inaction, 
despite their duty to work at the behest of the investors. Id. 
88 Crespi, supra note 14, at 173; Thompson, supra note 82, at 770–72. Performing loans 
are those loans where the borrower is still paying the mortgage payments. Berry, supra 
note 21. 
89 Crespi, supra note 14, at 173; see Thompson, supra note 82, at 771–72. The servicer 
pay fee arrangement was crafted before the current economic climate, so investors and 
servicers alike never envisioned having to modify or foreclose such a large proportion of 
their loans. Crespi, supra note 14, at 173. The growth in the number of foreclosures has 
also left servicers with a severe shortage of qualified staff to perform loan modifications. Id. 
90 Crespi, supra note 14, at 173; Thompson, supra note 82, at 767–68. Simply stated, 
servicers can make more money from foreclosing homes than from modifying loans. 
Thompson, supra note 82, at 771–72. This incentive structure depresses the number of 
loan modifications below what is the most economically prudent action from the perspec-
tive of the investors. Id. at 770–71. 
91 Crespi, supra note 14, at 174. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. Moreover, lenders believe that borrowers who face a high likelihood of eventually 
losing their homes will do little or nothing to maintain their homes and may even contribute 
to their deterioration, which would further reduce the lender’s expected recovery. Manuel 
Adelino et al., Why Don’t Lenders Renegotiate More Home Mortgages? Redefaults, Self-Cures, and 
Securitization 7 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Bos. Pub. Policy Discussion Paper Series, Paper No. 09-
4, 2009), available at http://www.bos.frb.org/economic/ppdp/2009/ppdp0904.pdf. 
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gotiate loans will cause other borrowers to expect modifications in the 
future and cause further losses.94 
 Currently, underwater homeowners have only a few options to 
help improve their economic situation.95 Although the federal gov-
ernment has attempted to bolster the housing market by increasing 
demand and reducing interest rates, these efforts have not restored 
housing prices to their pre-recession levels.96 Instead, they have merely 
stabilized the market.97 Similarly, the government has expended no 
appreciable effort in encouraging loan modification for underwater 
borrowers.98 Bankruptcy remains a non-option for underwater borrow-
ers as well because the bankruptcy system generally lacks the authority 
to reduce the principal owed on mortgages.99 Given the lack of avenues 
of recourse for underwater homeowners, there remains the potential 
for a cascade of strategic defaults and foreclosures that could wreak 
havoc on the mortgage markets and the overall economy.100 
                                                                                                                     
B. Eminent Domain 
 Without sustained improvements in the housing market or effec-
tive efforts at the federal level to address negative equity, many reform-
ers are calling for more localized solutions.101 One proposed solution 
suggests that municipalities should use the power of eminent domain 
to condemn underwater mortgages.102 Eminent domain is the power of 
government to take privately owned property and convert it for a pub-
 
94 Crespi, supra note 14, at 174–75. Lenders are, in effect, worried about the conta-
gious effect of modifying loans. Id. Lenders fear that loan modifications will spread to oth-
er borrowers if the lenders show a willingness to modify in the first instance. Id. 
95 See id.; Thompson, supra note 82, at 770. 
96 Crespi, supra note 14, at 178–79. The government has chosen to try to increase 
housing prices rather than try to decrease principal owed by homeowners. Id. The gov-
ernment attempted to increase housing prices by providing general economic stimulus 
and tax credits, intervening in the markets for mortgage-backed securities, and encourag-
ing government-sponsored entities to make purchases. Id. An increase in housing prices to 
the peak levels seen in 2006 and 2007 would largely eliminate the homeowner negative 
equity problem. Id. at 179. These efforts, however, have not yet successfully increased hous-
ing prices. Id. 
97 Id. at 179. 
98 Id. at 179–80; see infra note 96 and accompanying text. 
99 Levitin, supra note 51, at 571. 
100 Crespi, supra note 14, at 179; Wilkinson-Ryan, supra note 45, at 1575; see also White, 
supra note 50 (discussing the decreasing stigma attached to strategic default). 
101 Hockett, supra note 14, at 7; Robert J. Schiller, Reviving Real Estate Requires Collective 
Action, N.Y. Times, June 24, 2012, at BU6; Reiss, supra note 19, at 5. 
102 Gottlieb & Kim, supra note 20, at 4; Reiss, supra note 20, at 35; Berry, supra note 21. 
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lic use.103 By using eminent domain, municipalities would be forcing 
the sale of the mortgage from the lender to the government, thereby 
putting the government in the shoes of the lender.104 After doing so, 
municipalities could then control the mortgages and adjust the home-
owner’s principal below fair market value.105 
 The power of eminent domain predates the Constitution and is a 
natural power designated to sovereign governments.106 The Fifth 
Amendment’s Taking Clause both confirms this power and acts as a 
limit, stating “nor shall private property be taken for public use, without 
just compensation.”107 States, as sovereign governments, possess the 
power of eminent domain and have delegated it to its municipalities.108 
As such, municipalities can participate in condemnation proceedings 
to take property for public use.109 
 Eminent domain is traditionally used to acquire land or real prop-
erty.110 The taken property is often used to build roads, waterways, and 
defense installations, as well as government and public buildings.111 
The process has also been used to help alleviate blight in troubled ar-
eas.112 More recently, the power has been a tool to develop urban areas, 
as it has been used to convert private land into shopping malls and 
large retailers.113 
 Although eminent domain is usually used to acquire land and real 
property, in the case of underwater mortgages the municipality would 
be condemning contracts.114 Even still, the power is not limited to only 
                                                                                                                      
103 26 Am. Jur. 2d Eminent Domain § 2 (2013); Black’s Law Dictionary, supra note 12, 
at 601. 
104 Reiss, supra note 20, at 35; Sheridan, supra note 20, at 113. 
105 Gottlieb & Kim, supra note 20, at 4; Reiss, supra note 20, at 35. 
106 26 Am. Jur. 2d Eminent Domain § 3; Black’s Law Dictionary, supra note 12, at 601; 
see Asper, supra note 26, at 491–92 (stating that the “Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment 
is a ‘tacit recognition of a preexisting power to take private property for public use, rather 
than a grant of new power’” (quoting U.S. v. Carmack, 329 U.S. 230, 242–43 (1946))). 
107 U.S. Const. amend. V; Asper, supra note 26, at 491–92. 
108 26 Am. Jur. 2d Eminent Domain § 26 (2013). 
109 Id. 
110 Daniel P. Dalton, Introduction, in Eminent Domain: A Handbook of Condemna-
tion Law, at xv, xv (William Scheiderich et al. eds., 2011); see also Black’s Law Diction-
ary, supra note 12, at 601 (defining “eminent domain” as “[t]he inherent power of a gov-
ernment entity to take privately owned property, esp. land” (emphasis added)). 
111 Dalton, supra note 110, at xv. 
112 See, e.g., Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32–33 (1954) (interpreting the role of the 
judiciary narrowly, thereby recognizing a municipality’s broad discretion in determining 
whether redesign of an area containing blight was a constitutional taking for eminent do-
main purposes). 
113 Dalton, supra note 110, at xv. 
114 Gottlieb & Kim, supra note 20, at 4; Reiss, supra note 20, at 35. 
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real property.115 Of particular interest, eminent domain has been au-
thorized to condemn securities and contract rights.116 Further, the 
Connecticut legislature has authorized its municipalities to use the 
power of eminent domain to condemn income tax exclusions from 
bond covenants.117 Bond covenants are the legally binding terms be-
tween a bond issuer and a bond holder.118 By condemning the bond 
covenants, Connecticut was functionally condemning debt in the inter-
ests of collecting taxes.119 
C. The Plan 
 Advocates for reform have recently proposed that municipalities 
should use eminent domain to condemn mortgages with negative eq-
uity—i.e., the Plan.120 Municipalities in states such as California, New 
York, Illinois, and Massachusetts have looked into the feasibility of im-
plementation.121 One California city has passed a bill to implement the 
Plan, but the city has been unable to proceed without a supermajority 
of support.122 
                                                                                                                      
 
115 See, e.g., Cincinnati v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 223 U.S. 390, 398 (1912) (dis-
cussing the condemnation of a right of way). 
116 See U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 29 n.27 (1977) (“The States re-
main free to exercise their powers of eminent domain to abrogate such contractual rights, 
upon payment of just compensation.”). For example, in the 1906 U.S. Supreme Court case 
Offield v. New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Co., shares of stock were condemned to 
enable the company to improve a section of railroad. 203 U.S. 372, 375 (1906). 
117 Conn. Gen. Stat. § 12-242gg (2013); see Billions in Tax Revenue Stays in State, Thanks to 
Squire Sanders, Squire Sanders, http://www.squiresanders.com/de/experience/casestudies/ 
CaseStudyDetail.aspx?StudyID=493 (last visited Nov. 15, 2013). 
118 See Black’s Law Dictionary, supra note 12, at 205. 
119 Comment Letter from Graham Williams, Chief Exec. Officer, Mortg. Resolution 
Partners, to Alfred Pollard, General Counsel, Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency (Sept. 7, 2012) [here-
inafter MRP Comment Letter], available at http://mortgageresolutionpartners.com/sites/ 
default/files/attachments/fhfa_comment_letter_9.7.12.pdf; see Conn. Gen. Stat. § 12-242gg. 
120 Hockett, supra note 16, at 150–55; John E. Husing, Opinion, The Housing Crisis, Eminent 
Domain and the Public Interest, San Bernadino County Sun (Calif.), (Oct. 9, 2012, 9:00AM), 
http://www.sbsun.com/general-news/20121010/the-housing-crisis-eminent-domain-and-the- 
public-interest; Brad Miller, supra note 19; Reiss, supra note 19, at 5. 
121 Josh Harkinson, Take My Mortgage, Please, Mother Jones, Mar.-Apr. 2013, at 13, 13 
(stating that California, Illinois, and New York have all investigated the feasibility of such 
plans); Eleazar David Melendez, Brockton, Massachusetts, Considers Eminent Domain to Address 
Foreclosures, Huffington Post ( Jan. 11, 2013, 4:52 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
2013/01/11/brockton-eminent-domain-foreclosure_n_2458369.html (discussing how a Mass- 
achusetts city investigated such a plan). 
122 David Morrison, California City May Leverage Eminent Domain on Mortgages, Credit 
Union Times (Sept. 25, 2013), http://www.cutimes.com/2013/09/25/california-city-may-
leverage-eminent-domain-on-mor?ref=hp. The Richmond City Council located in Rich-
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 The Plan proposes that municipalities condemn mortgages where 
the homeowners owe more than the appraised worth of the home.123 
Specifically, the Plan would likely target underwater mortgages which 
are securitized in private trusts.124 Loan servicers are significantly less 
likely to modify principal down on these mortgages than on a compa-
rable mortgage held in a bank portfolio.125 Despite the current struc-
ture of the Plan to include all underwater mortgages, municipalities 
could alter the Plan to condemn only mortgages which have been per-
forming and exclude those which are delinquent or defaulting.126 
 Under the Plan, a municipality would pay the lender 20–25% less 
than the fair market value of the home as compensation for the mort-
gage.127 This calculation—described as the “foreclosure discount” —is 
based on the predicted fair market value of the loan, due to the high 
rate of foreclosures on underwater mortgages.128 Proponents of the 
Plan justify the calculation given the projected savings of transaction 
costs that the lender would incur if the property went through foreclo-
sure.129 Advocates also claim that this calculation mirrors what under-
water mortgages are traded for in secondary mortgage markets.130 
 Then, the municipality would own the loan and functionally act as 
the lender.131 Accordingly, the municipality would have the power to 
                                                                                                                      
mond, California voted 4–3 to go forward with the plan, but the city cannot proceed with-
out an additional vote because state law requires a supermajority. Id. 
123 See MRP Comment Letter, supra note 119, at 1. 
124 See id. at 1, 3–4; supra notes 83–85 and accompanying text (discussing the process 
and difficulties of securitized mortgages). 
125 See MRP Comment Letter, supra note 119, at 2; supra notes 83–85 and accompany-
ing text. The competing interests of different parties who have an ownership interest in 
the mortgage make it difficult for servicers to ensure that no party is unhappy with a modi-
fication. Crespi, supra note 14, at 169–70. 
126 Gottlieb & Kim, supra note 20, at 8; MRP FAQs, supra note 20. Although the Plan 
originally sought to condemn only underwater mortgages that were performing, it has 
since been amended to include delinquent and defaulting mortgages as well. Gottlieb & 
Kim, supra note 20, at 8. 
127 Gottlieb & Kim, supra note 20, at 4; Sheridan, supra note 20, at 115; Berry, supra 
note 21. These numbers, though widely cited, are preliminary estimates of what munici-
palities believe could be just compensation. MRP Comment Letter, supra note 119, at 5. 
Until the mortgages are condemned and good faith negotiations (or litigation) are used to 
determine the price of the property, the proposed foreclosure sale price is just an estimate. 
Id. 
128 Gottlieb & Kim, supra note 20, at 4; Berry, supra note 21; see Smith, supra note 12. 
129 Gottlieb & Kim, supra note 20, at 4; see Berry, supra note 21. 
130 See MRP FAQs, supra note 20. MRP also claims that their valuation methodologies 
mirror those used by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the quasi government entities that 
purchase mortgages to provide a secondary home mortgage market. MRP Comment Let-
ter, supra note 119, at 1–2. 
131 MRP Comment Letter, supra note 119, at 6. 
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adjust the principal owed by the homeowner to below fair market val-
ue.132 Given that the municipality paid less than the fair market value of 
the home for the mortgage, lowering principal to make the home no 
longer underwater can be done without having taxpayers bear the 
cost.133 The municipality could then sell the adjusted mortgages back 
to established lenders, thereby returning them to the market at a de-
creased rate for the homeowners.134 
 Given the large up-front costs associated with buying these mort-
gages—even at their discounted rate—municipalities would need initial 
investors to fund the Plan.135 An advocacy group, Mortgage Resolution 
Partners (“MRP”), has agreed to pair the municipality with investors to 
fund the capital needed to condemn such mortgages.136 In turn, these 
investors would be repaid with interest after the loan is resold.137 MRP 
would collect a flat fee per mortgage from the investors—not the mu-
nicipality—for facilitating the process.138 
 This Plan would be extremely beneficial to underwater homeown-
ers.139 Homeowners would regain a mortgage where the outstanding 
principal is below the fair market value of the home.140 The lower prin-
cipal owed would lead to lower monthly mortgage payments.141 Fur-
thermore, given that the principal owed is less than the fair market val-
ue, homeowners would be able to immediately build equity in their 
homes.142 Homeowners could then refinance at the current low inter-
est rates, further lowering their monthly mortgage payments.143 
                                                                                                                      
132 Id. 
133 See Gottlieb & Kim, supra note 20, at 6; MRP Comment Letter, supra note 119, at 6. 
To lower principal, the municipality—as the lender—would simply refinance the loan and 
adjust the terms. See Gottlieb & Kim, supra note 17, at 4; Sheridan, supra note 20, at 113. 
134 See Gottlieb & Kim, supra note 20, at 4; Sheridan, supra note 20, at 113. 
135 See Gottlieb & Kim, supra note 20, at 4. 
136 Id.; see MRP FAQs, supra note 20. 
137 MRP FAQs, supra note 20. 
138 Id. The current proposal has MRP receiving $4500 from investors for its role in fa-
cilitating the process. Gottlieb & Kim, supra note 20, at 4; Berry, supra note 21. MRP argues 
that this fee is similar to the fee paid by the federal government to banks that modify loans 
under federal programs. MRP FAQs, supra note 20. 
139 See Reiss, supra note 20, at 35; Sheridan, supra note 20, at 115; Husing, supra note 120. 
140 Gottlieb & Kim, supra note 20, at 4; Sheridan, supra note 20, at 115; Husing, supra 
note 120. 
141 Gottlieb & Kim, supra note 20, at 4; Reiss, supra note 20, at 35. 
142 Husing, supra note 120. 
143 Gottlieb & Kim, supra note 20, at 4; Husing, supra note 120. This is especially true as 
current interest rates on home loans are at historic lows. See Interest Rate Trends, Mortgage 
Info. Serv., http://mortgage-x.com/trends.htm (last visited Nov. 10, 2013) (providing data 
that shows that at the heyday of the housing crisis in 2008, interest rates were significantly 
higher than the interests now available to homeowners). 
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 Additionally, the municipality could directly benefit from imple-
menting the Plan.144 For a municipality wherein a large number of 
homes have negative equity, preventing foreclosures is a major con-
cern.145 Modifying the principal owed by homeowners to below the fair 
market value of the home could prevent foreclosures that act to drain 
government resources, decrease surrounding property values, and low-
er tax revenue.146 The municipality and, in turn, the taxpayers do not 
bear the costs of implementing the proposal, despite the significant 
benefits.147 By compensating lenders below the fair market value of the 
home, the municipality can modify the principal to any amount in ex-
cess of this price without having to expend any additional funds.148 
 Lenders, on the other hand, would bear most of the costs associ-
ated with this Plan.149 They would be compensated only for the foreclo-
sure discount price of the home despite being owed the full value of the 
mortgage.150 As a result, lenders receive significantly less—the adjusted 
price of the home minus transaction costs—than they would have re-
ceived had the loan been repaid.151 The foreclosure discount price nec-
essarily assumes that all mortgages will go through foreclosure around 
the time of condemnation.152 This is true because any mortgages that 
would not go through foreclosure would require that the municipality 
compensate lenders the full value of the outstanding mortgages.153 
Lenders oppose the Plan largely because of the disparity between the 
                                                                                                                      
144 Hockett, supra note 14, at 6; Husing, supra note 120. 
145 See Smith, supra note 12. 
146 Husing, supra note 120; see Goodman et al., supra note 15, at 32; see supra notes 66–
69 and accompanying text (describing the negative effects that foreclosures inflict on mu-
nicipalities and local communities). 
147 Gottlieb & Kim, supra note 20, at 6. 
148 See id. at 4; Sheridan, supra note 20, at 115. 
149 See Sheridan, supra note 20, at 115. Because the Plan only considers those mort-
gages that have been securitized, the investors of these MBS’s would actually be bearing 
most of the cost of the Plan. See Sheridan, supra note 20, at 115. Although these investors 
took large risks investing in these mortgage pools, many of the shares are likely held by 
pension funds, 401k’s, and other financial accounts held by the middle class. Gottlieb & 
Kim, supra note 20, at 6; see Husing, supra note 120. 
150 See Berry, supra note 21; supra note 128 and accompanying text. 
151 See Berry, supra note 21; supra note 129 and accompanying text. 
152 See Gottlieb & Kim, supra note 20, at 4. 
153 Memorandum from Dellinger et al. to SIFMA, supra note 21, at 2; see Gottlieb & 
Kim, supra note 20, at 4. In these situations, to pay less than the fair market value of the 
home would not satisfy the “just compensation” prong of the Takings Clause. See infra 
notes 271–276 and accompanying text. 
2186 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 54:2167 
full value of the mortgage that they are owed and the very low foreclo-
sure discount price that they would receive under the Plan.154 
 Since the Plan’s emergence, various groups have both supported 
and opposed its proposal.155 The benefit to homeowners in reducing 
their mortgage principal is obvious, but proponents of the Plan have 
further claimed that it will benefit communities as a whole and stabilize 
the larger economy.156 Opponents of the Plan, however, are worried 
not only about the negative effect on banks, but also the instability that 
such a proposal could bring to housing markets and the economy at 
large.157 Opposition has been so fierce that the banking industry has 
stepped up its lobbying efforts against the Plan.158 A bill was even pro-
posed to Congress to make implementation functionally impossible.159 
                                                                                                                      
 
154 See Memorandum from Dellinger et al. to SIFMA, supra note 21, at 2. 
155 Compare, e.g., This Dog Won’t Hunt, supra note 24, at 2 (supporting the Plan), with 
Husing, supra note 120 (opposing the Plan). For example, the FHFA, the Security Industry 
and Financial Markets Association (“SIFMA”), Chicago Mayor Rahm Emmanuel, and nu-
merous Wall Street firms have specifically opposed the Plan. Gottlieb & Kim, supra note 20, 
at 6. Alternatively, a number of economists, law professors, and politicians have supported 
the Plan. Brad Miller, supra note 18; see Reiss, supra note 19, at 5; Husing, supra note 120. 
In a show of support, Lieutenant Governor of California Gavin Newsom wrote a letter to 
the Department of Justice to urge the Department to investigate whether the threats of 
lenders and MBS investors—promising to restrict consumers’ access to capital in munici-
palities condemning underwater mortgages—constituted restraint of trade. Letter from 
Gavin Newsom, Lieutenant Governor of Cal., to Eric Holder, U.S. Att’y Gen., (Sept. 10, 
2012), available at http://www.ltg.ca.gov/09102012_LTG_DOJ_LETTER.pdf. 
156 See Hockett, supra note 14, at 3; Husing, supra note 120. 
157 See This Dog Won’t Hunt, supra note 24, at 2. Opponents have expressed concern that 
the Plan could limit credit access and make mortgages more expensive in communities that 
implement the Plan. Gottlieb & Kim, supra note 20, at 6; Sheridan, supra note 20, at 116–17. 
Some observers fear that the use of eminent domain to condemn mortgages could make 
lenders more unwilling to lend in municipalities for fear of future condemnation of their 
investments if home prices decline again. See Brad Finkelstein, California Trade Chief: Eminent 
Domain Will Curtail Lending, Nat’l Mortgage News (Aug. 10, 2012, 8:41AM), http:// 
www.nationalmortgagenews.com/dailybriefing/eminent-domain-California-mortgage-lend- 
ing-curtail-Fred-Kreger-1031742-1.html. The FHFA echoed this argument in its opposition to 
the Plan, as it feared that the Plan could have a chilling effect on the extension of credit to 
borrowers. Use of Eminent Domain to Restructure Performing Loans, 77 Fed. Reg. 47,652 
(Aug. 9, 2012). Other commentators have refuted this theory, claiming that if there is money 
to be made by lending in a particular region, investors will invest. Reiss, supra note 19, at 35; 
see Hockett, supra note 14, at 8. Even if there is not a chilling of the credit markets, however, 
the price of a mortgage could marginally increase to account for the future potential of con-
demnation. Reiss, supra note 19, at 4. 
158 Brian Collins, Industry Is Lining Up to Block Eminent Domain Laws, Nat’l Mortgage 
News (Sept. 25, 2012, 10:59AM), http://www.nationalmortgagenews.com/features/block-
eminent-domain-laws-1032335-1.html. 
159 Press Release, Rep. John Campbell, Campbell Introduces The Defending American 
Taxpayers from Abusive Government Takings Act (Sept. 13, 2012), available at http://www. 
campbell.house.gov/press1/release-campbell-reintroduces-bill-to-protect-taxpayers-from-em 
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Even beyond whether municipalities should put the Plan into action, 
observers question whether local governments have the legal authority 
to use eminent domain to condemn mortgages in this way.160 
II. Satisfying the Takings Clause 
 The Plan has drawn ire from critics who have argued that the Plan 
is both bad policy and illegal.161 Although there are numerous poten-
tial legal issues implicated by the Plan, the first hurdle it must clear is 
the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause.162 The Takings Clause acts as a 
limit on the government’s power of eminent domain, requiring that a 
taking be for a public use and for payment of just compensation.163 Ac-
cordingly, for the Plan to be constitutional under the Takings Clause, 
there must be both a showing that the condemnation of underwater 
mortgages benefits the public and that the government justly compen-
sates the lenders.164 
 Section A of this Part examines the public use requirement of the 
Takings Clause and recent decisions that have impacted its interpreta-
tion.165 Then, Section B discusses the just compensation requirement 
of the Takings Clause.166 
                                                                                                                     
A. Public Use 
 Legal commentators have fiercely debated the precise meaning of 
the “public use” requirement of the Takings Clause, but there remains 
no consensus.167 The term has been interpreted broadly as meaning 
 
inent-domain-schemesan-taxpayers-from-abusive-government-takings-act/. The bill, “The 
Defending American Taxpayers from Abusive Government Takings Act,” would prohibit 
federal agencies like Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, the FHA, and the Veterans Administration 
from purchasing, making, insuring, or guaranteeing loans in any county which used emi-
nent domain to condemn mortgages. Id. 
160 Memorandum from Dellinger et al. to SIFMA, supra note 21, at 1; Tambe et al., su-
pra note 24, at 4. 
161 Memorandum from Dellinger et al. to SIFMA, supra note 21, at 1; Tambe et al., su-
pra note 24, at 4; see This Dog Won’t Hunt, supra note 24, at 2. 
162 See U.S. Const. amend. V; Sheridan, supra note 20, at 114. 
163 See U.S. Const. amend. V. 
164 See id.; Memorandum from Dellinger et al. to SIFMA, supra note 21, at 2. 
165 See infra notes 167–203 and accompanying text. 
166 See infra notes 204–218 and accompanying text. 
167 Alberto B. Lopez, Weighing and Reweighing Eminent Domain’s Political Philosophies Post-
Kelo, 41 Wake Forest L. Rev. 237, 240 (2006) (stating that “[t]he oscillating definition of 
public use is a magnet for eminent domain debate”); Asper, supra note 26, at 492 (describ-
ing that “[o]ne aspect of the Takings Clause that American courts have never truly agreed 
upon is what constitutes a public use for the purposes of eminent domain”). 
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“for a public purpose,” but there is disagreement about what exactly 
constitutes a public purpose.168 
                                                                                                                     
 Certain uses of eminent domain have long been considered public 
uses and are uncontroversial.169 For example, the condemnation of pri-
vate land for public ownership to build public buildings, parks, and 
roads is directly for public use and therefore constitutional.170 The 
condemnation and transfer of property to a private party, often com-
mon carriers who make the property available to the public, is similarly 
uncontroversial and constitutional.171 Moreover, the condemnation of 
blighted property is also recognized as a public use in that it benefits 
the surrounding community.172 
 Other uses of eminent domain, however, have proven more con-
troversial.173 The use of eminent domain to transfer property between 
private parties is particularly controversial, though not necessarily un-
constitutional.174 For example, in 1984, in Hawaii Housing Authority v. 
Midkiff the U.S. Supreme Court determined that transferring property 
from one private party to another to disband an oligopoly over land 
ownership was constitutional.175 There, the taking was upheld, despite 
the fact that the recipients of the taken land were private parties with 
no intent to use the land for any purpose that one often considers to be 
for public use.176 Instead, the Court decided that the potential benefit 
 
168 See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 520 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting) 
(noting that “[o]nce one permits takings for public purposes in addition to public uses, no 
coherent principle limits what could constitute a valid public use”); Asper, supra note 26, at 
492–93. 
169 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 497–98 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); see infra notes 170–172 and ac-
companying text. 
170 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 497 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); see, e.g., Old Dominion Land Co. v. 
United States, 269 U.S. 55, 66 (1925) (holding that the condemnation of land for the ac-
quisition of military buildings qualified as a public purpose). 
171 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 498 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); see, e.g., Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. 
v. Bos. & Me. Corp., 503 U.S. 407, 422–23 (1992) (holding that the condemnation of rail-
road property to supply to a common carrier qualifies as a public purpose). 
172 See, e.g., Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32–33 (1954) (interpreting the role of the 
judiciary narrowly in holding that the redesign of an area containing blight was constitu-
tional). 
173 See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 498 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); Ilya Somin, What If Kelo v. City 
of New London Had Gone the Other Way?, 45 Ind. L. Rev. 21, 21 (2011); infra notes 174–181 
and accompanying text. 
174 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 498 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); see Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 
U.S. 229, 243–44 (1984); Somin, supra note 173, at 21. 
175 467 U.S. at 243–44. 
176 Id. at 244. 
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in disbanding the oligopoly over land in Hawaii was itself a sufficient 
public use.177 
 Similarly, in 2005, in Kelo v. City of New London, the Supreme Court 
held that the transfer of property from one private owner to another 
for economic revitalization was constitutional as a public use under the 
Takings Clause.178 There, the government used eminent domain to 
condemn privately owned homes in order to build a privately owned 
research facility.179 In Kelo, the plan was proposed to create jobs, gener-
ate tax revenue, and improve the aesthetics of the area.180 Again, de-
spite the transfer of property from one private party to another, the po-
tential benefit of economic revitalization was sufficient for the Court to 
find a public use.181 
 The Court’s holdings in both Midkiff and Kelo are partially due to 
the judiciary’s deferential approach to the public use clause.182 Courts 
are traditionally reluctant to strike down the use of eminent domain for 
fear of preventing worthwhile government projects.183 The judiciary 
has recognized that the local body determining condemnations will be 
more cognizant of the needs of the community than a federal court.184 
 Given this deferential approach to the public use clause, courts do 
not require the government to prove with reasonable certainty that the 
expected public benefits will occur.185 Instead, the proposed benefits 
must be both rational and possible, rather than certain.186 The Court in 
Kelo articulated this point when it emphasized that judicial evaluation 
                                                                                                                      
177 Id. The concentration of land ownership in Hawaii was staggering. See id. at 232. Al-
though governments owned almost 49% of Hawaii’s land, another 47% was in the hands of 
only seventy-two land owners. Id. In fact, eighteen landholders owned more than 40% of 
this land. Id. 
178 545 U.S. at 477–90. 
179 Id. at 474–75. 
180 Id. at 474. 
181 Id. at 477–90. 
182 Id. at 480; Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 244; Paul W. Tschetter, Student Article, Kelo v. New 
London: A Divided Court Affirms the Rational Basis Standard of Review in Evaluating Local De-
terminations of ‘Public Use,’ 51 S.D. L. Rev. 193, 194 (2006). 
183 See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 480 (“Without exception, our cases have defined [the public 
use] concept broadly, reflecting our longstanding policy of deference to legislative judg-
ments in this field.”); Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 244 (“Judicial deference is required because, in 
our system of government, legislatures are better able to assess what public purposes 
should be advanced by an exercise of the taking power.”). 
184 Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 244. 
185 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 487–88; Tschetter, supra note 182, at 205. 
186 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 488; Tschetter, supra note 182, at 205. 
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of the likelihood of success of different plans would impede and delay 
worthwhile projects.187 
 Despite giving broad latitude to the government in takings cases, a 
legitimate public benefit is nevertheless required.188 Justice Anthony 
Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Kelo emphasized this point, noting 
that the stated public purpose needs to be paramount, and not merely 
incidental to the benefits of the private parties.189 This focus is in-
tended to limit the potential for abuse by municipalities.190 When pri-
vate parties benefit greatly from a condemnation, the standard ensures 
that the government did not engage in any impropriety by engaging in 
“impermissible favoritism.”191 In Kelo, for example, the Court deter-
mined that New London’s plan for economic revitalization was the rea-
son for condemnation, and not that the owners of the new research 
facility would enjoy private benefits.192 
                                                                                                                     
 The Court in Kelo analyzed the comprehensive nature of the pro-
posed plan to determine whether the public benefits were paramount 
to any private benefits.193 Specifically, the construction of the research 
facility would require condemnation of numerous individual parcels of 
private property.194 Taken individually, the condemnation of each indi-
vidual parcel does not benefit the public, because one plot of land 
would not be sufficient to revitalize the neighborhood.195 Taken to-
gether, however, the plan used the taken lands in an organized way to 
redevelop an underutilized area of the city.196 
 Alternatively, the Court has relied on a second approach whereby 
it considers the degree to which eminent domain will prevent or allevi-
ate harm.197 This reasoning offers justification for the traditional use of 
 
187 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 488 (noting that postponing condemnation until courts can de-
termine the success of a project would create “a significant impediment to the successful 
consummation of many such plans”). 
188 Id. at 487–88; id. at 491 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
189 Id. at 491 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
190 See id. at 493. 
191 See id. at 491. 
192 See id. at 492. 
193 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 483–84 (majority opinion). 
194 See id. at 474. 
195 See id. at 484. It would be difficult to argue that a section of a parking lot by itself, or 
any other isolated piece of the plan in Kelo, would benefit the public without viewing it in 
the context of the larger development. See id. 
196 See id. The Court also emphasized that requiring a comprehensive plan would as-
suage some fear held by some that believed that municipalities would condemn single 
parcels or even small groups of parcels to sell to wealthy developers for increased tax reve-
nue. Id. at 486–87. 
197 Id. at 500 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
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eminent domain: to build public projects.198 Private landowners could 
potentially harm the public if they required compensation greatly ex-
ceeding the actual worth of the property because such demands would 
halt government projects.199 This rationale also helps to explain con-
demnation of blight where the property being condemned can damage 
a neighborhood’s property values and potentially breed crime.200 For 
example, in Midkiff, the Court justified the use of eminent domain to 
allow for more landowners because it would help to alleviate the prob-
lem of an inequitable housing market caused by Hawaii’s oligopoly of 
land ownership.201 Moreover, Kelo serves as an example of where con-
demnation was appropriate to improve a community, but where the 
taken property was not previously causing any harm.202 Despite the 
proposed benefits of the urban revitalization plan, Justice Sandra Day 
O’Connor argued that the condemnation was not appropriate because 
the private homes being condemned were not causing any harm to the 
community.203 
B. Just Compensation 
 In addition to requiring that property must be taken for a public 
use, the Takings Clause also requires payment of just compensation.204 
Although courts have interpreted the public use requirement deferen-
tially for fear of halting worthwhile government projects, the just com-
pensation requirement has been dutifully enforced to prevent the gov-
ernment from imposing significant harm on the property owner.205 
One scholar has described the just compensation requirement as the 
sole viable check on the government’s constitutional power of eminent 
domain.206 In its 1960 decision in Armstrong v. United States, the Su-
preme Court described the just compensation requirement as a way of 
preventing a small group of citizens from bearing the costs of a project 
                                                                                                                      
198 See Thomas J. Miceli, The Economic Theory of Eminent Domain: Private 
Property, Public Use 27–31 (2011) (discussing the holdout problem and how eminent 
domain is a solution to this potential market failure). 
199 See id. 
200 See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 500 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
201 Id.; see Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 243–44. 
202 See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 500–01 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
203 Id. (articulating that the homes being condemned for the development project 
were not causing any harm to the community despite the proposed public benefit). 
204 U.S. Const. amend. V. 
205 See James Geoffrey Durham, Efficient Just Compensation as a Limit on Eminent Domain, 
69 Minn. L. Rev. 1277, 1278 (1985). 
206 Id. 
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that should be absorbed by society.207 Just compensation mitigates the 
loss suffered by landowners when their land is seized because it at-
tempts to place them in the same financial position they were in before 
the taking.208 
 The most common method to determine just compensation is to 
consider the property’s fair market value.209 Fair market value is the 
price that a willing buyer would pay a willing seller for the property at 
an arm’s length transaction.210 Although fair market value attempts to 
evaluate the cost to the property owner, its deferential nature prevents 
it from accounting for costs beyond the market value.211 For example, 
fair market value does not consider the tangible costs associated with 
having to replace property or the intangible costs associated with the 
owner’s personal appreciation of the particular piece of property.212 
 A court determines just compensation by analyzing both the gov-
ernment’s and the private party’s calculation of fair market value.213 
Advocates usually present comparable properties and their sale prices 
as evidence of fair market value.214 As such, when considering the fair 
market value of underwater mortgages, the price at which similar 
mortgages with similar negative equity were valued and sold for could 
inform the calculation of just compensation.215 
                                                                                                                      
207 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960); see Asper, supra note 26, at 496. 
208 United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 373 (1943). 
209 Durham, supra note 205, at 1285. 
210 Miller, 317 U.S. at 374. 
211 See Durham, supra note 205, at 1288; Brett Talley, Recent Development, Restraining 
Eminent Domain Through Just Compensation: Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655 
(2005), 29 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 759, 766 (2006). 
212 Talley, supra note 211, at 766; see Durham, supra note 205, at 1288. Fair market value 
ignores, for example, the replacement of land and improvements, relocation and moving 
costs, loss of business revenues, lost customer goodwill, and demoralization. Talley, supra 
note 211, at 766. Because of this, some argue that fair market value is instead the practical 
minimum that the court could have chosen as constituting just compensation under the 
Takings Clause. Durham, supra note 205, at 1288. One scholar has argued that due to fair 
market value’s already under-compensation of property owners, any payment below that 
level would contradict the logical meaning of “just compensation” as required by the Tak-
ings Clause. Id.; see U.S. Const. amend. V. Despite this, the scholar argues that courts re-
main seemingly more worried about overpaying property owners than about undercom-
pensating them. See Durham, supra note 205, at 1292–93. 
213 See Durham, supra note 205, at 1291–92; Asper, supra note 26, at 496. 
214 See Durham, supra note 205, at 1291–92; Asper, supra note 26, at 496. In general, 
appraisers look at data concerning the sales of similar properties and adjust the valuation 
based on differences between the properties. Asper, supra note 26, at 496. 
215 See Asper, supra note 26, at 496. 
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 Although fair market value is the traditional standard for determin-
ing just compensation, alternative measures could be used.216 Courts 
have favored fair market value as a practical general rule, but courts 
have never designated it as the sole measure of just compensation.217 
Courts can apply standards with more just results when the typical appli-
cation of fair market value would result in injustice to the owner or to 
the public.218 
III. Is the Plan Constitutional?: A Public Benefit  
Short on Compensation 
 Although the Plan as currently construed satisfies the public use 
requirement of the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause, it fails to pro-
vide just compensation.219 To pass constitutional muster, municipalities 
would need to provide additional compensation to lenders.220 This ex-
tra compensation might, however, make the Plan economically, and 
thereby politically, infeasible.221 
 Section A of this Part argues that the Plan likely satisfies the public 
use requirement due to the proposed benefits to the community.222 
Then, Section B argues that municipalities’ calculation of just compen-
sation will likely be viewed skeptically by courts and—if valued higher 
than the fair market value of the underlying home—likely make the 
Plan impracticable for local governments.223 
A. The Plan Satisfies the Public Use Requirement 
 Traditionally, courts grant municipalities broad discretion in defin-
ing the public purpose that justifies the municipality’s use of eminent 
domain.224 This deference stems from the fear of preventing worth-
                                                                                                                      
216 United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 512 (1979) (recognizing how 
courts have applied standards other than fair market value to avoid a “manifest injustice” 
to property owners or the public”). 
217 Id. 
218 Id.; see United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488, 490 (1973) (stating that just compensa-
tion stems from principles of equity and fairness in addition to property law). 
219 See U.S. Const. amend. V; infra notes 224–249, 258–283 and accompanying text. 
220 See infra notes 258–283 and accompanying text. 
221 See infra notes 284–303 and accompanying text. 
222 See infra notes 224–249 and accompanying text. 
223 See infra notes 250–307 and accompanying text. 
224 See, e.g., Kelo v. New London, 545 U.S. 469, 480 (2005); see also supra notes 182–184 
and accompanying text (describing the broad discretion used by courts regarding the pub-
lic use requirement). 
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while public projects.225 A court may be hesitant to prevent the execu-
tion of the Plan where it achieves bedrock community goals like pre-
venting foreclosure, stimulating the economy, and stabilizing the hous-
ing markets.226 
 For the Plan to be constitutional, it must first provide a legitimate 
public benefit to the community.227 Here, it is possible that decreased 
negative equity will reduce the number of foreclosures.228 Additionally, 
the decrease in the number of underwater mortgages could serve to 
stabilize local housing markets.229 The increased well-being of the 
mortgage and housing markets could greatly benefit not only the local 
community, but the general economy as well.230 Furthermore, with de-
creased mortgage payments, homeowners will retain more disposable 
income to help stimulate the local economy.231 
 The economic consequences of enacting the Plan are unclear, but 
it is rational to believe that lowering principal on underwater mort-
gages will prevent foreclosures and bring stability to the housing mar-
ket.232 Potential benefits to the community need only be possible, how-
ever, not reasonably certain.233 In the Supreme Court’s 2005 decision 
Kelo v. City of New London, the construction of a research facility was not 
guaranteed to revitalize the community, but the possibility of revitaliza-
tion was sufficient for the Court to hold that the taking was for a public 
use.234 
 The fact that underwater mortgages are causing harm to the eco-
nomic stability of many communities also supports the Plan’s constitu-
tionality.235 Although Justice O’Connor opposed the use of eminent 
domain in Kelo because the residential properties were not causing any 
harm, here underwater mortgages are actively handicapping economic 
                                                                                                                      
225 See Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 244 (1984); supra notes 182–184 and 
accompanying text. 
226 See Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 244; Husing, supra note 120. 
227 See supra notes 188–192 and accompanying text. 
228 See Hockett, supra note 16, at 175; Husing, supra note 120. 
229 See Nocera, supra note 18; Husing, supra note 120. 
230 See Hockett, supra note 14, at 3; Reiss, supra note 19, at 35. 
231 See Husing, supra note 120. 
232 See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 487–88; MRP Comment Letter, supra note 119, at 3. 
233 See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 487–88; supra notes 185–187 and accompanying text. 
234 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 487–88. 
235 See White, supra note 6, at 981–83; Zacks, supra note 11, at 545; supra notes 56–78 
and accompanying text (describing the numerous negative side effects that an onslaught 
of underwater mortgages and foreclosures can have on a community). 
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recovery.236 Negative equity has a deleterious effect on housing markets 
and the overall economy.237 Implementing the Plan could potentially 
alleviate these negative effects and improve mortgage and housing 
markets and the overall economy.238 Moreover, there remains a fear of 
a cascade of strategic defaults when considering the benefits underwa-
ter homeowners are able to receive by going through foreclosure.239 
The resulting increase in foreclosure rates could cripple an already 
weakened economy and cause havoc in the mortgage markets.240 As 
such, preventing all of these harms could be used as further evidence 
of a public use by courts.241 
                                                                                                                     
 Additionally, the Plan follows a comprehensive development pro-
gram that has established set criteria to achieve the goal of economic 
recovery.242 As in Kelo, such a comprehensive development program as-
suages the fear that a transfer of property is done primarily for private 
gain.243 Here, the Plan does not condemn any mortgage with the indi-
vidual homeowner in mind as a beneficiary; instead the Plan focuses on 
the community’s goal of minimizing negative equity, thereby preventing 
future foreclosures.244 Although investors stand to profit from imple-
mentation, they are merely collecting interest on the loan provided to 
the city.245 MRP will also profit, but they are collecting only a flat fee per 
mortgage from investors.246 Regardless of the benefits received by inves-
 
 
236 See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 500–01 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (articulating that the homes 
being condemned for the development project were not causing any harm to the commu-
nity despite the proposed public benefit); Husing, supra note 120. 
237 See White, supra note 6, at 981–83; Zacks, supra note 11, at 545; supra notes 56–78 
and accompanying text. 
238 See Hockett, supra note 14, at 2; Husing, supra note 120. 
239 Crespi, supra note 14, at 179; Wilkinson-Ryan, supra note 45, at 1575; see also White, 
supra note 50 (discussing the decreasing stigma attached to strategic default); supra notes 
95–100 and accompanying text. 
240 See Crespi, supra note 14, at 179; Wilkinson-Ryan, supra note 45, at 1575. 
241 See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 500 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); Husing, supra note 120. 
242 See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 483–84; MRP Comment Letter, supra note 119, at 1. 
243 See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 493 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
244 See id. at 483–84 (majority opinion); MRP FAQs, supra note 20. Opponents contest 
this point, claiming that the Plan is primarily intended to enrich MRP. Tambe et al., supra 
note 24, at 4; see Memorandum from Dellinger et al. to SIFMA, supra note 21, at 12. De-
spite these opponents’ claims, law professors, economists, and politicians with no financial 
interests in the proposal have come forward supporting the Plan as beneficial to the pub-
lic. Miller, supra note 18; see Reiss, supra note 19, at 5; Husing, supra note 120. 
245 MRP FAQs, supra note 20. 
246 See Gottlieb & Kim, supra note 20, at 4; MRP FAQs, supra note 20; supra note 138 
and accompanying text. This fee is similar to the fee paid by the federal government to 
banks that modify mortgages under federal programs. MRP FAQs, supra note 20. More-
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tors and MRP, compensating a private party for aiding implementation 
of the Plan does not take away from the overall public use element of 
the Plan.247 
 Although the Plan’s constitutionality under the Takings Clause has 
been questioned, the Plan would almost certainly satisfy the public use 
prong of the Takings Clause.248 The Plan’s potential benefits, the def-
erential nature of public use review, and the lack of apparent impropri-
ety all lead to the conclusion that the Plan serves a public purpose.249 
B. The Calculation of Just Compensation Will Determine the Plan’s Fate 
 Proponents would likely be successful in demonstrating the Plan’s 
public use, but there is little margin for error in determining just com-
pensation.250 The current framework compensates lenders at the fore-
closure sale price of the mortgage.251 Given that this price is the lowest 
amount that a lender could receive for an underwater mortgage, it is 
                                                                                                                      
over, the fee is not paid by the municipality, but instead by investors, so MRP is not directly 
receiving public funds. See id. 
247 See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 477–90. For example, if compensating a private party to aid in 
implementing a public use project, the long recognized practice of taking land to con-
struct public parks would no longer be considered a public use if contractors were re-
quired for construction. See id. In Kelo, the private company opening a research facility—
largely paid for by public funds—was benefitting greatly, but the Court decided that the 
company was only aiding the city in its goal of economic revitalization. See id. at 492 (Ken-
nedy, J., concurring). 
248 See supra notes 224–247 and accompanying text. Although rhetoric opposing the 
Plan speaks largely of redistribution norms, this discussion is largely irrelevant with regards 
to the Plan’s constitutionality under the Takings Clause. Memorandum from Dellinger et 
al. to SIFMA, supra note 21, at 3; see U.S. Const. amend. V. If there are potential benefits 
to the public by condemning underwater mortgages, then the requirement is satisfied, 
regardless of whether private homeowners stand to benefit from condemnation of a bank’s 
property. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 484. Opponents also believe that the Plan could set prece-
dent for municipalities to condemn rich peoples’ property for the redistribution to the 
poor—that is unrealistic. See id. at 486–87; Memorandum from Dellinger et al. to SIFMA, 
supra note 21, at 3. The just compensation requirement would minimize any potential 
harm to people whose property is being condemned for this kind of redistribution because 
the government must compensate the property owner before any possible redistribution 
takes place. See U.S. Const. amend. V; Memorandum from Dellinger et al. to SIFMA, supra 
note 21, at 3. It would be nearly impossible for a municipality to condemn a rich commu-
nity member’s property for redistribution where the government would be forced to im-
mediately compensate the community member for the lost property. See U.S. Const. 
amend. V; Memorandum from Dellinger et al. to SIFMA, supra note 21, at 3. 
249 See supra notes 224–247 and accompanying text. 
250 See U.S. Const. amend. V; Durham, supra note 205, at 1285; Gottlieb & Kim, supra 
note 20, at 4. 
251 Gottlieb & Kim, supra note 20, at 4; Berry, supra note 21; supra notes 127–128 and 
accompanying text (describing the compensation calculation under the Plan). 
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likely that courts will find this calculation inadequate.252 Instead, courts 
will likely calculate just compensation to be the fair market value of the 
loan.253 If, instead, courts calculate just compensation to be above the 
fair market value of the home, it would be impossible for the municipal-
ity to eliminate negative equity without expending additional funds.254 
Expending such additional funds—costs that the taxpayers would inevi-
tably bear—would likely make the Plan politically impractical.255 
 Subsection 1 of this Section argues that the Plan’s current calcula-
tion of just compensation inadequately compensates lenders and there-
fore does not pass constitutional muster.256 Subsection 2 of this Section 
argues that if the Plan were altered to provide additional compensation 
to lenders, it ceases to be politically feasible.257 
1. The Current Plan Does Not Provide Just Compensation 
  Based on traditional norms of just compensation, the calculation 
of just compensation would be determined by the fair market value of 
the mortgage.258 Although the loan is issued for the home, the fair 
market value of the loan is not necessarily the fair market value of the 
home.259 The proper determination of fair market value for the mort-
gage should be what a willing buyer would pay a willing seller at an 
arm’s length transaction for the mortgage.260 This calculation will likely 
                                                                                                                      
252 See U.S. Const. amend. V; Durham, supra note 205, at 1285; Gottlieb & Kim, supra 
note 20, at 4; Berry, supra note 21. 
253 See Durham, supra note 205, at 1291–92; Asper, supra note 26, at 496. 
254 See Gottlieb & Kim, supra note 20, at 4; see also supra note 148 and accompanying 
text (describing how only when a municipality pays under the fair market value of the 
home can the municipality ensure that it does not expend any additional funds to imple-
ment the Plan). 
255 See Memorandum from Dellinger et al. to SIFMA, supra note 21, at 6–7. 
256 See infra notes 258–283 and accompanying text. 
257 See infra notes 284–307 and accompanying text. 
258 See United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 374 (1943); Durham, supra note 205, at 
1285. 
259 See Hockett, supra note 14, at 1 (arguing that the fair market value of the loan is 
significantly below the outstanding principal); Memorandum from Dellinger et al. to SIF-
MA, supra note 21, at 6–7 (arguing that the fair market value of the loan is close to the 
outstanding balance plus anticipated interest payments). Although it could be easy to con-
flate the two ideas, they are very different. See Hockett, supra note 16, at 155; Memoran-
dum from Dellinger et al. to SIFMA, supra note 21, at 6–7. The fair market value of the 
home is a fairly straightforward comparison of real estate appraisals. Asper, supra note 26, 
at 496. The fair market value of the mortgage—the crux of this discussion—is determined 
by what a willing buyer would pay a willing seller for the right to own the loan. See Miller, 
317 U.S. at 374; Hockett, supra note 16, at 155; Memorandum from Dellinger et al. to 
SIFMA, supra note 21, at 6–7. 
260 See Miller, 317 U.S. at 374. 
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be based on an independent valuation of the loans or based on what 
similar underwater loans are trading for on secondary markets.261 
 Advocates of the Plan propose that the fair market value of the 
mortgage is approximately 20–25% off the fair market value of the 
home.262 This is the projected foreclosure sale price.263 Advocates jus-
tify this price on the assumption that all of the underwater mortgages 
will eventually go through foreclosure.264 If all of the underwater 
homes did go through foreclosure, proponents of the Plan argue that 
this would be the amount that the lenders would receive for the mort-
gages.265 The fact that underwater mortgages have traded for this dis-
count in secondary markets is used as further evidence of the correct-
ness of this calculation of fair market value.266 
 It is very unlikely, however, that all underwater mortgages will go 
through foreclosure, despite this being an assumption necessary to 
make the foreclosure discount calculation under the Plan constitution-
ally adequate.267 Most underwater mortgages which have been per-
forming continue to perform, regardless of negative equity.268 Further, 
despite the huge benefits, strategic default is still relatively rare among 
underwater homeowners.269 As such, it is unlikely that just compensa-
tion will be calculated based on the assumption that all of the mort-
gages will end in default.270 
 Because not all underwater mortgages end in default, they will be 
valued at a price higher than this foreclosure sale price.271 The foreclo-
sure discount price is an estimate of the lowest possible value of the 
                                                                                                                      
261 See MRP Comment Letter, supra note 119, at 1–2 (arguing that the use of valuation 
methodologies employed by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac could be used to calculate just 
compensation); MRP FAQs, supra note 20 (arguing that underwater mortgages being sold 
on secondary markets could be used as evidence to determine just compensation). 
262 Gottlieb & Kim, supra note 20, at 4; Berry, supra note 21; supra note 127 and ac-
companying text. 
263 Gottlieb & Kim, supra note 20, at 4; Berry, supra note 21; supra note 128 and ac-
companying text. 
264 Gottlieb & Kim, supra note 20, at 4; Berry, supra note 21; see Smith, supra note 12. 
265 See Gottlieb & Kim, supra note 20, at 4. 
266 See MRP FAQs, supra note 20. 
267 See White, supra note 6, at 971–72; Memorandum from Dellinger et al. to SIFMA, 
supra note 21, at 7. 
268 Memorandum from Dellinger et al. to SIFMA, supra note 21, at 7; see White, supra 
note 6, at 971–72. 
269 See White, supra note 6, at 983. The stigma attached to foreclosure is strong and has 
led many homeowners to stay in their homes, even if not economically prudent. Id. 
270 See id.; Memorandum from Dellinger et al. to SIFMA, supra note 21, at 7. 
271 See Durham, supra note 205, at 1285; Memorandum from Dellinger et al. to SIFMA, 
supra note 21, at 6–7. 
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mortgage.272 Traditional just compensation of fair market value is not 
the lowest fire-sale price of the property—in this case the foreclosure 
discount price—but instead the price that a willing buyer would pay to 
a willing seller at an arm’s length transaction.273 A willing buyer would 
likely pay more than the assumed foreclosure sale price because that 
price only represents the lowest amount that the investment would re-
cover.274 If any of the mortgages continue to perform, they would nec-
essarily be worth more than this minimum price.275 Given that the 
mortgages are often worth more than this fire-sale foreclosure discount 
price, this valuation would be unlikely to pass constitutional muster.276 
 The instability in the mortgage markets may also lead courts to use 
a standard different than fair market value.277 If courts truly felt that 
the application of fair market value principles resulted in injustice, the 
courts would have discretion to consult a different standard.278 This 
alternative standard, however, would almost certainly result in greater 
compensation to lenders.279 If a court decided that the value of an un-
derwater mortgage in an arm’s length transaction did not account for 
the full value of the property—given its value in diversifying risk in a 
securitized bundle, for example—lenders could be compensated in 
excess of fair market value.280 Although a court may be sympathetic to 
underwater homeowners, it would be very unlikely for a court to use a 
standard different than fair market value in order to provide less com-
pensation to the lenders whose mortgages are being condemned.281 
                                                                                                                      
272 See Gottlieb & Kim, supra note 20, at 4. If home prices fell, the mortgages would ac-
tually be worth less than the foreclosure sale price. See id. The amount that would be re-
couped in case of foreclosure is based on what the home will sell for at auction minus 
transaction costs. See id. If home prices fell, mortgages that defaulted would be worth even 
less. See id. 
273 Durham, supra note 205, at 1284–85. 
274 See id. at 1285; Memorandum from Dellinger et al. to SIFMA, supra note 21, at 6–7. 
275 See Memorandum from Dellinger et al. to SIFMA, supra note 21, at 6–7. 
276 See White, supra note 6, at 983; Memorandum from Dellinger et al. to SIFMA, supra 
note 21, at 7. 
277 See United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 512 (1979). 
278 See id. One such example where fair market value would be an insufficient measure 
of just compensation would be in the case of property that is infrequently traded, which 
would make it too difficult to predict adequate prices because of the lack of previous 
transactions. See 564.54 Acres, 441 U.S. at 513. 
279 See id. 
280 See id.; Durham, supra note 205, at 1288. 
281 See 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. at 512; Durham, supra note 205, at 1288. Paying 
lenders less than the fair market value of the mortgage would likely not satisfy the just 
compensation requirement of the Takings Clause. See U.S. Const. amend. V.; Durham, 
supra note 205, at 1288. 
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 The current Plan’s foreclosure discount valuation of just compen-
sation is constitutionally inadequate, because it is based on the faulty 
assumption that all underwater mortgages will default.282 Given that 
most mortgages which are performing continue to perform regardless 
of negative equity, these mortgages would be worth more than this fire-
sale valuation in an arm’s length transaction, thereby compensating 
homeowners below what would be considered just compensation under 
the Takings Clause.283 
2. The Eventual Calculation of Just Compensation Will Determine the 
Plan’s Feasibility 
 The current Plan does not require municipalities to bear the costs 
of lowering principal on underwater mortgages.284 Instead, the Plan 
proposes that lenders realize losses, which would allow the municipality 
to lower principal to below fair market value and avoid spending tax 
dollars.285 If valuation of the mortgages is above the fair market value of 
the homes, it would be impossible for municipalities to adjust principal 
below fair market value without bearing some of the cost.286 As such, 
the eventual calculation of just compensation will determine if munici-
palities can lower principal to eliminate a homeowner’s negative equity 
without requiring taxpayers to expend additional funds to achieve this 
end.287 
 Although the foreclosure sale price would fail the just compensa-
tion requirement, the mortgages are also not worth the full value of the 
loan—the originally contracted principal plus interest.288 This is true 
because underwater mortgages often end in foreclosure.289 Moreover, 
owning a home with negative equity leaves homeowners with little mar-
gin for error, because refinancing is not available for emergencies.290 
                                                                                                                      
282 See supra notes 258–276 and accompanying text. 
283 See supra notes 258–276 and accompanying text. 
284 Gottlieb & Kim, supra note 20, at 6. 
285 See id. at 4, 6; Sheridan, supra note 20, at 115. Importantly, if the amount lenders 
are compensated is accurately the fair market value of the loans, then the condemnation 
would not be causing losses for the lenders, but rather revealing already existing losses. 
Miller, supra note 19. Lenders oppose this realization, stating that it would force a mark to 
market event, where for accounting purposes they finally recognize the true value of these 
assets. Reiss, supra note 20, at 3. Although forcing banks to realize their losses is important 
to investors, it is irrelevant in determining constitutionality. Id. 
286 See Gottlieb & Kim, supra note 20, at 6; supra note 148 and accompanying text. 
287 See Gottlieb & Kim, supra note 20, at 6. 
288 See Goodman et al., supra note 15, at 29; Hockett, supra note 16, at 154–55. 
289 Why Foreclosure Happens, supra note 43; see Goodman et al., supra note 15, at 29. 
290 See Goodman et al., supra note 15, at 29; Why Foreclosure Happens, supra note 43. 
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Negative equity greatly increases the odds that these mortgages will end 
in foreclosure and decreases the value of the mortgages.291 Further-
more, even though strategic default is not currently common, the fear 
remains that it will occur more often as information spreads and the 
stigma attached to foreclosure begins to fade.292 Accordingly, even be-
fore any precipice of defaults occurs, the fear of this cascade of defaults 
could lower the value of the mortgages.293 
  Advocates on both sides of the debate will likely offer evidence 
to demonstrate why their valuation of just compensation is accurate, 
but in this economy it could be difficult for the trier of fact to deter-
mine a fair amount.294 Advocates for the Plan claim that the value can 
be calculated at below the fair market value of the home by using the 
valuation methodologies used by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac—quasi-
government entities that oversee the mortgage industry.295 Opponents, 
however, have highlighted that because performing loans generally 
continue to perform, many of these mortgages would be sold for sig-
nificantly more than the fair market value of the underlying home.296 
With such systemic dysfunction in the marketplace it could be difficult 
to find a truly accurate value for a pool of underwater mortgages.297 
 The correct valuation is likely between the advocates’ proposed 
fire-sale price and the lenders’ proposed full principal plus interest.298 
Though there are legitimate arguments for using either valuation, the 
true value is likely somewhere in the middle.299 If a court determines 
just compensation to be below the fair market value of the home, even 
if not 20–25% below, the Plan could still potentially eliminate negative 
equity.300 Unfortunately for proponents of the Plan, if just compensa-
tion is valued at anything above the fair market value of the home, the 
                                                                                                                      
291 See Goodman et al., supra note 15, at 29; Why Foreclosure Happens, supra note 43. 
292 See Crespi, supra note 14, at 179; Wilkinson-Ryan, supra note 45, at 1575; see also Hock-
ett, supra note 16, at 134 (discussing real estate analysts’ estimates that between 7.4 million 
and 9.4 million additional homes are at serious risk of default in the coming six years). 
293 See Crespi, supra note 14, at 179; Wilkinson-Ryan, supra note 45, at 1575. 
294 See Hockett, supra note 16, at 134; Memorandum from Dellinger et al. to SIFMA, 
supra note 21, at 6–7; cf. Jaconetty, supra note 69, at 235 (discussing the difficulty in finding 
an accurate valuation of home prices in the current real estate market). 
295 MRP Comment Letter, supra note 119, at 1–2. 
296 Memorandum from Dellinger et al. to SIFMA, supra note 21, at 6–7. 
297 Cf. Jaconetty, supra note 69, at 235. 
298 See Hockett, supra note 16, at 134; Memorandum from Dellinger et al. to SIFMA, 
supra note 21, at 6–7. 
299 See Hockett, supra note 16, at 134; Memorandum from Dellinger et al. to SIFMA, 
supra note 21, at 6–7. 
300 See Gottlieb & Kim, supra note 20, at 4. 
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Plan would be unable to get homeowners fully out of negative equity 
without additional funding.301 Though modifying the principal down, 
even if not below fair market value, would provide some relief to the 
homeowners, it would likely remain insufficient to alleviate the fear of 
foreclosure.302 Ironically, until strategic default becomes more com-
mon, which would further decrease the value of underwater mortgages, 
the just compensation for these mortgages will likely remain above the 
fair market value of the property thereby making principal reductions 
through the use of eminent domain economically impossible.303 
 Even if it would be impossible to use eminent domain to reduce 
principal without taxpayer money, the threat of it alone might be 
enough.304 Currently, loan servicer incentives and pure inertia have 
prevented restructuring of these mortgages.305 This has occurred de-
spite the significant value in lowering principal of these mortgages to 
reduce the risk of default.306 Perhaps the expense of litigation challeng-
ing the Plan will be enough to bring about mediation between the 
lenders and borrowers to come to an agreement on the fair value of 
these loans—hopefully preventing foreclosures while saving both par-
ties ample time and money.307 
Conclusion 
 With the federal government offering little help to families still 
struggling from the housing crisis, people are starting to look for alter-
native solutions. The Plan first proposed by Robert Hockett offers one 
such solution: using eminent domain to condemn mortgages with neg-
                                                                                                                      
301 See id.; supra note 148 and accompanying text. 
302 See MRP Comment Letter, supra note 119, at 3; Husing, supra note 120. It could be 
argued that the potential benefits of the Plan would no longer be attainable if the relief 
was merely that homeowners still remained underwater—albeit with less negative equity. 
See MRP Comment Letter, supra note 119, at 3; Husing, supra note 120. More problematic, 
however, is that such a modification to the Plan could, in effect, render the Plan no longer 
constitutional under the public use prong. See Kelo, 545 U.S at 491 (Kennedy, J., concur-
ring) (discussing that the public benefit must be paramount in order to satisfy the public 
use prong). 
303 See White, supra note 6, at 971–72; Memorandum from Dellinger et al. to SIFMA, 
supra note 21, at 6–7. 
304 See Don’t Condemn Underwater Mortgages. Renegotiate., Bloomberg (Aug. 9, 2013, 12:06 
PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-08-09/don-t-condemn-underwater-mortgages- 
renegotiate-.html. 
305 See id. 
306 See id.; supra notes 79–81 and accompanying text (describing the incentives for 
lenders to modify loans). 
307 See Don’t Condemn Underwater Mortgages. Renegotiate., supra note 304. 
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ative equity. Under the Plan, municipalities would pay lenders 20–25% 
less than the current fair market value of the home to condemn the 
underwater mortgages. Municipalities would then adjust the principal 
on these mortgages to current market rates, thereby eliminating the 
homeowner’s negative equity. This Plan has the potential to prevent 
foreclosures, reduce blight, and bring stability to the housing markets. 
 Despite the benefits of the Plan, the Plan most likely runs afoul of 
the just compensation prong of the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause. 
To satisfy the just compensation requirement, the Plan would have to 
be amended to increase the amount of compensation provided to 
lenders. Increasing the amount of compensation is impossible, how-
ever, without requiring municipalities—and the taxpayers that they rep-
resent—to bear the burden of the Plan. As such, the increase would 
make the Plan politically and economically infeasible both because 
municipalities would lack the resources to contribute these additional 
funds and because taxpayers would object to this use. Instead, one can 
hope that the mere possibility that the Plan may be enacted—however 
unlikely that possibility may be—is enough to encourage banks and 
lenders to renegotiate and modify loans in an effort to save underwater 
homeowners from continuing to drown in their negative equity. 
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